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The Swaziland Electricity Company Limited (SEC) is the only electricity utility company in 
Swaziland tasked with the provision of electricity services and products. It is 100% owned 
by Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland and is managed via an appointed Board of 
Directors. The Company has generally performed well in the past. However, since 2010, a 
number of factors have contributed to the profitability levels not being entirely satisfactory. 
Coincidentally at about the same time, the Government introduced through Circulars No. 3 
of 2010 and No. 4 of 2013, new regulations meant to control the remuneration of managers 
within public enterprises. Since then, SEC’s employee turnover has increased necessitating 
the need to review the extent to which the new remuneration regulations have impacted on 
performance management within the company including the ability of employees to stay and 
remain productive within the Company. Pay differentiation models are multifaceted and are 
generally a combination of goal setting, skills and qualifications, increased employee loyalty 
and performance. Ultimately, the reasons employees choose to stay in organisations is not 
reflective of any one theory but a combination of factors. Using the mixed method approach 
with a bias towards qualitative research and premised on purposeful sampling, perceptions of 
SEC managers were obtained via a semi structured questionnaire. The study targeted 60% of 
the sample population i.e. SEC managers. The findings highlighted their views on; the new 
pay regulations, the impact of the new pay regulations on their performance and that of the 
company, as well as on reward management and employee retention. Ultimately, 85% of 
SEC managers that participated in the study, perceived the new pay regulations as extremely 
detrimental to their performance and that of the Company. They not only disagreed with the 
rationale for the new pay regulations but also indicated that they were badly conceived and 
are ineffectual in driving the Company to higher performance levels. SEC managers prefer 
that pay regulations are the product of consultation between management, Boards as well as 
Government and that the current regulations, are the key driver of employee turnover within 
the company which has also negatively affected talent management. In designing pay 
systems for PE’s, Government is urged not to adopt a ‘one glove fits all approach’ as public 
enterprises are different and their underlying operational imperatives complex. Nevertheless 
it is recognised that the new pay regulations have formed the basis for effective control of 
remuneration within public enterprises, a necessary intervention to address concerns on ‘out 
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According to Core et al (1999), debate around the level of compensation for executive teams and senior 
management in organisations, has reached fever pitch in recent years. Governments, shareholders, Boards 
of Directors, academics, the business community in general and employee representative bodies, have all 
demanded a say in how senior managers are compensated and rewarded for their performance as well as 
input in organisations. Essentially, the debate has centred around two key questions, according to Core et 
al (1999); who should correctly set pay policy and how can superior performance be rewarded.  
 
Filatotchev & Allcock (2010), argue that in the past two decades, executive compensation has moved 
from fixed pay structures to remuneration schemes that are predominantly linked to performance and 
share ownership structures. They further argue that the role played by shareholders (as principals) and 
Boards of Directors in determining the structure and shape of executive compensation, is pivotal to the 
debate around what constitutes fair and value adding compensation, particularly the need for increased 
accountability.  
 
This research seeks to explore the phenomena on executive compensation and in particular, how it affects 
the performance of organisations as well as related issues of employee retention and motivation. The 
research is based on a case study of the remuneration of senior managers of the Swaziland Electricity 
Company Limited (SEC) and how it has affected the performance of the Company. Before we explore the 
rationale for this research and what it seeks to achieve, it is necessary that we create a context for the 
study, beginning with an appreciation of Swaziland as a country and its economic outlook. We will 
thereafter highlight the public enterprise environment of Swaziland given that SEC is a public enterprise 
as well as detail the history of SEC. Given that the core subject matter is remuneration, we will then 
proceed to explain the evolution of the remuneration policy of public enterprises in Swaziland. By doing 
so, we will hopefully create the context of understanding the rationale for the research and why it became 
necessary to investigate the extent to which the remuneration of senior managers has affected (or not 





1.2 Overview of Swaziland 
 
According to the Renewables Readiness Assessment Report (2013), the Kingdom of Swaziland is a 
landlocked country located in the Southern African region and covers an area of 17,364 km². Countries 
that border Swaziland, are the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and Mozambique. RSA shares about ¾ of 
its boundary with Swaziland and the rest is shared with Mozambique. As contained in the Central 
Statistics Office Report (2011), Swaziland’s population is about 1,080,337, with an annual growth rate of 
about 1.2%. The report further highlights that at least 29% of the people live below the poverty line. The 
Central Bank of Swaziland Report (2012/13) indicates that Swaziland’s estimated Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita is about USD 3,186 which categorises the country as a lower middle-income 
country. Furthermore, that Swaziland’s economy is fairly differentiated with the following features: 
 
a) The dominant sector being agriculture (mainly sugar related processing and forestry) and 
manufacturing (mainly textiles, metal works and light manufacturing) representing about 51% of 
the GDP;   
b) The mining sector which contributes a paltry 0.5% to GDP; 
c) The services sector, particularly government services provided predominantly via public 
enterprises, which constitutes the outstanding 48% of GDP.  
 
According to the Central Bank of Swaziland Report (2013/14), most goods and services are sourced from 
the South African Customs Union (SACU), with over 94% of imports coming from the Republic of South 
Africa. Swaziland’s economy is therefore inextricably linked to that of the RSA.  
1.3 Public Enterprises in Swaziland 
 
Given the dominance of the services sector which effectively contributes about 48% to Swaziland’s GDP, 
the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland (GoS), has remained active in owning most organisations 
that provide services to the population. In this regard, the GoS maintains effective control and 
management of public enterprises (PE’s) through the Public Enterprises (Control and Monitoring) Act, 
No. 8 of 1989, hereinafter referred to as the PEU Act, which authority is exercised through the Public 
Enterprises Unit or Directorate which is located under the Ministry of Finance. In terms of the Public 






The PEU Act (1989) defines PE’s as public enterprises or bodies that are either owned in full by 
Government or where the Government has majority control or where the enterprise is largely reliant upon 
Government subvention for its financial support. The current categorisation of PE’s is detailed in Table 1-
1, below: 
 
Table 1-1: List of Public Enterprises in Swaziland (Source: PEU Report, 2013) 
CATEGORY A PUBLIC ENTERPRISES  
 Central Transport Administration (CTA) 
 Commercial Board* 
 Swaziland Development Finance Corporation 
(FINCORP) 
 Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (MVA) 
 National Agricultural Marketing Board 
(NAMBOARD) 
 Swaziland National Housing Board (SNHB) 
 National Industrial Development Corporation of 
Swaziland (NIDC) 
 National Maize Corporation (NMC) 
 Piggs Peak Hotel 
 Swaziland Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation (SPTC) 
 Royal Swazi National Airways Corporation 
(RSNA) 
 Sebenta National Institute 
 Small Enterprises Development Company 
(SEDCO) 
 Swaziland Cotton Board (SCB) 
 Swaziland Dairy Board (SDB) 
 Swaziland Development and Savings Bank (Swazi 
Bank) 
 Swaziland Electricity Company (SEC) 
 Swaziland Investment Promotion Authority (SIPA) 
 Swaziland Water And Agricultural Development 
Enterprise (SWADE) 
 Swaziland National Provident Fund (SNPF) 
 Swaziland National Trust Commission (SNTC) 
 Swaziland Railway 
 Swaziland Television Authority (STVA) 
 Swaziland Tourism Development Company* 
 Swaziland Water Services Corporation (SWSC) 
 University of Swaziland (UNISWA) 
 National Emergency Response Council On 
HIV/Aids (NERCHA) 
 Swaziland Standards Authority (SWASA) 
 Swaziland Tourism Authority (STA) 
 Central Bank of Swaziland 
 Manzini City Council 
 Mbabane City Council 
 Swaziland Royal Insurance Corporation 
 Public Service Pensions Fund 
 Financial Services Regulatory Authority 
(FSRA) 
 Macmillan 
 Swaziland Energy Regulatory Authority 
(SERA) 
 Swaziland Industrial Development 
Company (SIDC) 
 Lulote – BMEP 
 All Town Councils 
 Financial Intelligence Unit 
 Swaziland Environmental Authority 
(SEA) 
 Swaziland National Youth Council 
(SNYC) 
 Swaziland National Sports Council 
(SNSC) 
 Youth Enterprise Fund (YEF) 
 Swaziland National Council of Arts and 
Culture (SNCAC) 
 Swaziland Revenue Authority (SRA) 
 Swaziland Civil Aviation Authority 
SWACAA) 
 Siteki Good Shepherd Hospital 
 Swaziland Nazarene Health Institutions 
(RFM) 
 Swaziland Competitions Commission 
(SCC) 
 Swaziland Christian University (SCU) 
 Swaziland Red Cross 
 National Disaster Management Agency 
 Swaziland Public Procurement 
Regulatory Authority 









 Swaziland Communications Commission 
 South African Nazarene University 
 
The Swaziland Electricity Company (SEC) falls under Category A as noted in Table 1-1 above and as 
highlighted in the SEC’s Annual Report 2013/14, the company is wholly owned 100% by the GoS and is 
the sole provider of electricity services in Swaziland. The SEC business model focuses on the entire 
electricity value chain which includes generation, transmission, distribution and systems operations. 
 
1.4 History of the Swaziland Electricity Company 
 
As contained in the SEC’s Annual Report (2012/13), the organisation came into existence in 1963 and 
was known as the Swaziland Electricity Board. The Company therefore turned 50 years on the 1st April 
2013. Prior to this, electricity in Swaziland was a very scarce commodity and was restricted only to the 
historical and colonial bases of Mbabane and Manzini. The history of electricity in Swaziland is a very 
interesting one. As contained in the SEC’s 50th Anniversary Commemoration publication (2013), the first 
electric bulb to light up the skies of the Kingdom of Swaziland was mounted at the Mlilwane Game 
Reserve by James Weighton Reilly in the 1920s. This generator was later relocated to the Mbabane River 
just below the Mountain Inn, an old hotel located in the Mbabane town. The Mbabane town had been 
developed by the colonial British Government as the administrative capital of Swaziland and thus the 
relocation of the generator provided the town, much needed energy. Mbabane has remained Swaziland’s 
capital till today. According to the SEC’s 50th Anniversary Commemoration publication (2013), the 
power plant relocated to Mbabane by the Reilly’s, was sold to Mercer Coz who after a couple of years, 
later sold it to the Swaziland Government. 
 
As highlighted in the SEC’s 50th Anniversary Commemoration publication (2013), the Reilly family also 
brought electricity to the second biggest town in Swaziland, Manzini, which plant was later used to form 
the base of what was then later known as the Bremersdorp Electricity Company. It is further reflected that 
the Swaziland Government bought this company in 1955 for 50,000 British pounds, which later led to the 
formal establishment by the Government, of the Swaziland Electricity Board in April 1963. Since then as 
reflected in the SEC’s Annual Report (2013/14), the construction of the following power stations have 






a) Edwaleni Power Station which was inaugurated by Harry Oppenheimer and His Majesty, King 
Sobhuza 11, in September 1964. The installed capacity of this hydro power plant is 15MW. 
b) Ezulwini Power Station in 1985 with the installed capacity of this hydro power plant being 
20MW. 
c) Maguduza Power Station which started commercial operations in 1969, with an installed capacity 
of this hydro power plant being 5MW. 
d) The 400kV line that runs through Swaziland and supplies the Mozal Aluminum Smelter in 
Mozambique. This specific line is owned equally by a joint venture between Eskom in the 
Republic of South Africa, SEC in Swaziland and EdM in Mozambique via a company called 
MOTRACO. 
e) Maguga Power Station which was completed in 2001 with an installed capacity of 20MW. The 
Maguga Dam that feeds the hydro power station actually won the “South Africa Institute of Civil 
Engineering Award for most outstanding civil engineering achievement in the international 
category in 2001”, SEC Annual Report (2013/14: p3). 
 
SEC was transformed into a fully-fledged company in 2007 through Legal Notice No. 31 of 2007. All 
assets, rights, obligations and liabilities of the SEB, were transferred to SEC at the vesting date including 
employees. The Legal Notice No. 31 of 2007 introduced three critical pieces of legislation that would 
give rise to the current legal and regulatory framework of the company, namely:  
 
a) The Swaziland Electricity Company Act of 2007.  
b) The Energy Regulatory Authority Act of 2007. 
c) The Electricity Act of 2007. 
 
As already indicated, SEC has always been 100% owned by the Government of the Kingdom of 
Swaziland both when it was known as SEB and subsequent to its transformation to a fully-fledged 
company. The implications for this as reflected in the SEC Act (2007) and the PEU Act (1989), are 
sumamrised below: 
 
a) The Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland as sole shareholder, appoints a total of nine (9) 
Board Members into the SEC Board of Directors. This includes the Chief Executive Officer who 
is the only Executive Director. The SEC Board of Directors is responsible on behalf of the 





b) The shareholder also approves the recruitment of two Executive Directors, namely, the Chief 
Executive Officer and the Financial Director. The rest of the members of the company’s 
executive management, are appointed by the Board of Directors on the recommendation of the 
Chief Executive Officer. 
c) That as long as the Government is the sole shareholder, the Minister of Natural Resources & 
Energy performs the functions and exercises the responsibilities assigned to the Assembly of 
Shareholders by the Company’s Act, of 2007 with regards to the management of the company, 
payment of damages and approval of annual accounts. This also includes approval of the 
dividends policy and the external auditors. 
d) That unlike most public enterprises, SEC is liable for the payment of company tax. 
e) That given the reality that the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland remains the sole 
shareholder, SEC remains a Class A public enterprise and as already indicated, is subject to the 
provisions of the PEU Act of 1989. Thus all major decisions about investments, expansion plans, 
tariffs, employee and organisational changes, remuneration of employees, are subject to the 
approval of the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland through the Standing Committee on 
Public Enterprises (SCOPE). Members of SCOPE consist of the entire Cabinet of the 
Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland. 
 
1.5 The historical performance of the Swaziland Electricity Company 
 
As is reflected in the SEC Annual Report (2007/8), the reasons for the transformation of SEC from a 
public enterprise to a fully-fledged company were two-fold. Firstly, the Government’s desire was to lay 
the basis for the company to begin to attract private capital through equity ownership mainly to fund its 
capital and expansion requirements. Being a developing country, Swaziland’s financial budget is hugely 
burdened with socio-economic development priorities thus the need to explore alternative sources to 
funding the growth of the company. Secondly, through the diversification of ownership, Government 
hoped to attract strategic partners with experience in transforming public enterprises to high performance 
organisations.  
 
It is however critical that as part of creating a context to this research, the historical performance of SEC 
is analysed. As highlighted in Figure 1-1 below, SEC has experienced various levels of performance in 







Figure 1-1: SEC’s performance for the past eleven years from 2004 to 2014 (Source: SEC Annual Reports 2002-14) 
 
The reduced profitability of SEC in the last four (4) years in particular, has been a source of much debate 
and consternation particularly amongst management. Nevertheless, the focus of this research is not how 
SEC has performed in the past 11 years. The research has its roots in the desire to explore the 
relationship, if any, between the remuneration of SEC managers on the one hand and the performance of 
the company on the one hand. It however can be deduced that the performance of the company (in terms 
of profits) of 2010 to 2011, has not been repeated in the past three (3) years. The extent that this 
performance drop could be attributable to the remuneration of management in general will be the 
explored in Chapter Four. 
 
1.6 Problem Statement 
 
Through Circular No. 3 (2010), attached as Annexure A, government introduced guidelines on executive 
remuneration for all PE’s in Swaziland. Boards of Directors and Remuneration Committees of 
Government owned entities, were directed to use the guideline to remunerate Chief Executive Officers, 
Chief Financial Officers and Executive Teams of PE’s. The guideline further directed that the 
remuneration of the rest of the employees in PE’s must be aligned to Circular 3 of 2010. By issuing the 
guideline, government sought to control how PE’s remunerated their employees in general and their 
executives in particular, underpinned by the need to “establish a clear relationship between key executive 
performance and remuneration”, Circular 3 (2010: p2).  
 
Whilst Figure 1-1 above, highlights how the company has performed before and after the introduction of 
the guidelines on executive remuneration, Table 1-2 below, reflects the actual turnover experienced by the 
company before and after the period of the introduction of Circular 3 of 2010. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2024

























Table 1-2: SEC’s Turnover Rate from 2009 – 2013 (Source: SEC Annual Report, 2013/14) 












Turnover as a  
% of Manning 
levels 
Total 
Turnover as a  
% of Manning 
levels 
excluding VR 
2009/10 587 20 88 18.40% 3.41% 
2010/11 571 9 25 5.95% 1.58% 
2011/12 587 17 0 2.90% 2.90% 
2012/13 640 22 0 3.44% 3.44% 
2013/14 637 32 0 5.02% 5.02% 
 
The conclusion from Table 1-2 is that there has been an unfortunate increase in SEC’s turnover rate since 
the advent of Circular 3 of 2010. This specific guideline was reviewed by the Government with the 
publication of Circular No.4 of 2013, attached as Annexure B. The effect of Circular 4 of 2013 was that 
salary caps were slightly increased to cater for inflation. This however must be understood in its proper 
context. Between September 2010 when Circular 3 of 2010 was implemented and August 2013 when 
Circular 4 of 2013 was implemented, salaries for senior managers were not reviewed to keep up with 
inflation. Circular 4 of 2013 was therefore a welcome relief as it adjusted the 2010 rates for at least two 
cycles of inflation i.e. 2012 and 2013.  
 
However, the interpretation of Circular 4 of 2013, had the impact of making executive remuneration 
worse in that the bonus benefit was now included in the salary computation whereas Circular 3 of 2010 
had excluded bonus as part of guaranteed salary. In addition and as reflected in Circular 3, “where there 
are existing contractual arrangements which are not in line with these guidelines, there should not be an 
adverse effect on such obligations. At the expiry of an existing contract, the guidelines should be applied 
in determining the remuneration terms in the event that re-appointments occur", Circular 3 (2010: p9). 
There direct implication of this specific provision of Circular 3 of 2010 was that at contract renewal, the 
majority of managers will be subject to salary reduction so as to comply fully with the provisions of this 
Circular. Except where existing managers decided to exit the organisation, remaining managers had to be 
subjected to this untenable situation if they wished to stay and work for SEC. The remuneration 
guidelines, did not have any provision for impact mitigation measures to cushion affected managers 






1.7 Research Objectives 
 
Perkins and White (2011) aver that reward management is a powerful means of communicating value to 
employees in a manner that underscores direct reward versus criteria which is regulated over time and is 
linked to the business objectives of that organisation. The reality however is that reward in this context, 
occurs in the framework of an ongoing employment relationship and is intended to compensate effort. 
Therefore in order to limit subjective conclusions on whether the employee’s effort did indeed match 
organisational expectations, it becomes necessary to implement a clear performance management 
mechanism. Nevertheless, even with performance management, there is still no guarantee that the choices 
employees make, will complement the reward given. Dale-Olsen (2012) somehow concurs with the view 
espoused by Perkins and White and argues that generally, there is a minimal relationship between how a 
company remunerates its executives and its productivity. In his study premised on companies in Norway, 
Dale-Olsen found that companies that distinguished pay between fixed and productivity based pay, paid 
more for underperformance based pay than under fixed pay, and that how top management was paid, was 
linked more to the choice of remuneration schemes rather than the performance of the companies 
themselves.  
 
According to the SEC Act (2007), the company’s remuneration policy is determined by the Board of 
Directors on the recommendation of the Board’s Remunerations Committee. In addition, the governing 
board represents the shareholder. As in the case of SEC, the Board is appointed by the only shareholder, 
the Government. As highlighted by Circular No. 3 (2010), the Board did not have any input into the 
design of the remuneration guidelines as this was done by government itself and the new regulations are 
applicable on all PE’s in Swaziland. Fels (2010) puts forth the point that in order to address remuneration 
more effectively, the shareholder must increase its influence over the executives of the enterprise as a 
means of protecting the long-term sustainability of the company. Fels however, also argued that this must 
be done in conjunction with other interventions including improving overall corporate governance.  
 
Given the foregoing review of remuneration and its link to performance, it is clear that an understanding 
of performance management will provide us a better appreciation of how these two concepts interact. 
Performance management according to Lucica (2010) is a methodology which defines the key practices, 
attitudes, actions or approach to the enhancement of performance that are developed at the point of 
contact with the organization and are re-inforced throughout his/her tenure. Houldsworth & Jirasinghe 
(2006) go further and indicate that performance management occurs in a specific organising framework 






This research will therefore draw from the rich literature that is available on the topics of remuneration 
and performance. This will further be enhanced by the available literature from journal articles on the 
impact of remuneration on performance, particularly, how it aids or abates the latter. Therefore, the key 
research objectives are the following: 
 
a) To what extent do the new regulations on remuneration affect the performance of the Swaziland 
Electricity Company?  
b) To what extent does the Swaziland Electricity Company’s remuneration system affect the 
retention of new talent?  
c) How can SEC’s remuneration system effectively contribute towards the sustainability of the 
company?  
 
1.8 Motivation for the Research 
 
Given the foregoing, this research was conceived primarily to examine the extent to which the 
government pay regulations had affected performance of managers within the company. Through 
examining the perceptions of senior managers, insight will be derived and conclusions made on the 
existence or non-existence of a direct relationship between remuneration and performance. The 
performance of SEC prior and after the introduction of the guidelines on remuneration, with particular 
reference to the company’s ability to attract and retain key talent as well as on employee motivation, will 
be used to give a context to this research.   
 
Generally, this research is motivated by the desire to see PE’s being transformed to truly high 
performance organisations where talent management and retention, lies at the heart of each organisation’s 
human capital strategy. As reflected in the analysis of SEC’ performance highlighted in the Figure 1.1, 
the performance of SEC since the organisation was transformed to a limited liability company in 2007, 
does not bode well for the future viability of this critical PE. Given the reality that countries the size and 
profile of Swaziland have historically struggled to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to address the 
developmental needs of its people, PE’s like SEC have tended to play a very critical role not only in 
providing employment but also in addressing the infrastructure requirements of the country. The findings 






a) Assist in providing a coherent context on the unintended impact of Government policies on the 
performance of public enterprises in general; 
b) Contribute towards a better understanding of the impact of remuneration on the performance of 
SEC particularly since 2007; 
c) Be used as feedback to Government and the SEC Board of Directors, on the impact of the new 
pay regulations on employees generally and SEC managers in particular;   
d) Be useful to the Board of Directors of SEC in fully comprehending the views of the management 
collective with regards to remuneration policies and practices as well as their impact on enabling 
the development of the company to a high performance organisation; 
e) Enrich the knowledge base of the remuneration policies of PE’s and may be useful input into the 
development of  a more sustainable regulatory approach to remuneration of PE’s in Swaziland; 
and; 
f) Be considered as input into the development of an alternative remuneration philosophy and 
mechanism for public enterprises.  
 
1.9 Research Design and Methodology 
 
A literature review will be done in order to fully understand the theoretical foundation for this research. 
Empirical research will then be performed in order to determine the extent to which SEC managers 
perceive the Government initiated pay guidelines to be aiding or undermining their performance within 
the Company. 
 
1.10 Literature Review  
1.10.1. Data Collection 
 
Primary data will be collected from the company’s annual reports from 2004 to 2013, the government 
regulations on executive remuneration, relevant literature on remuneration systems particularly in public 
enterprises as well as journal articles on the subject. Secondary data will be gathered through the use of 
semi-structured interviews and from the focus group discussions.  
 
Once the data is collected from both the interviews and the focus group discussions, the information will 
be collated, grouped and transcribed. Thereafter the researcher as indicated by Creswell (2009) will 
attempt to understand the logic of the information gathered so that taken as a whole, its overall meaning is 





(SPSS). The key themes or categories that emerge will be discussed and qualified through direct 
quotations, supported by figures and tables. Finally, lessons drawn from the findings will be highlighted 
and contrasted with the available literature on remuneration and performance. It is the researcher’s 
intention that the findings will be used as useful input into the development of an alternative remuneration 
model for all PE’s in Swaziland. 
 
1.10.2 Empirical Research  
 
Essentially, the rationale for undertaking this research is to explore and to fully comprehend the 
perspectives of senior managers within the company on the question of remuneration, how it affects their 
performance and retention within SEC. As highlighted by Yin (2009), focused research makes it possible 
for researchers to make a holistic inquiry into real life events in a manner that allows for in-depth analysis 
of a particular phenomenon whilst at the same time ensuring that the context is fully represented.  
 
1.10.3 Use of Questionnaires 
 
Consistent with the views expressed by Creswell (2009), the research will therefore use the mixed method 
approach although with a greater leaning towards the qualitative approach. The data will be obtained from 
the participants own natural setting through semi structured questionnaires. However, given that the 
research will also exploit the use of figures and tables which are statistical in nature, the presentation of 
the results will lend itself to a mixed method approach.  Therefore, the presentation of your data will use 
mixed methods which according to Creswell (2009), is often used for numerous reasons. The quantitative 
and qualitative representation of data strengthens each perspective and to a large extent, provides 
profoundness to fully appreciating the phenomenon. As a researcher, I will thus derive certain insights 
and general themes from what the SEC managers have espoused and make interpretations from the 
meaning of the information gathered. Vithal & Jansen (2010) emphasised that in social science research, 
exploring and understanding implies that the study is qualitative in nature, as opposed to determining 
which suggests that the study is quantitative in nature. The sentiments expressed by the managers and 
their viewpoint on the extent to which the new remuneration regulations inhibit or enables their 
performance, will provide the researcher with a good basis from which to draw insight and to make 
certain conclusions about the new remuneration regulations. In particular, their views on whether or not 






The questionnaires will be divided into four sections as reflected below: -  
 
a) Section A – Biographical data 
b) Section B – their perspective of the new remuneration guidelines (their understanding on how the 
new guidelines were formulated and the objectives of the new guidelines) 
c) Section C – How the new remuneration guidelines have impacted on their performance 
d) Section D – How the new remuneration guidelines has affected their retention within the 
company  
 
A Likert four point scale will be used in the semi-structured interviews as indicated below: 
 
a) Knowledge of the new regulations: 1 = Strongly aware, 2 = aware, 3 = somewhat aware, 4 = 
not aware 
b) Impact of the new regulations: 1 = Hugely influential, 2 = influential, 3 = somewhat 
influential, 4 = not influential 
c) Satisfaction with the new pay regulations: 1 = Strongly satisfied, 2 = satisfied, 3 = dissatisfied, 
4 = very dissatisfied  
 
1.10.4 Sampling Population 
 
The sampling population will essentially consist of all sixty (60) managers of the company. The aim is to 
solicit the views of at least thirty six (36) managers and that this will be at least sixty percent (60%) of the 
targeted sample population. Their views on key issues around remuneration and its impact on 
performance as well as retention, will be solicited through a questionnaire. Given that this is a case study 
on the perspectives of SEC managers on the key issues of remuneration and its impact on performance, it 
is vital that a majority of the managers are given an opportunity to explore this phenomenon of the new 
remunerations regulations. Moreover, this approach to sampling is considered adequate for qualitative 
research because as argued by Leedy & Ormrod (2013), purposeful sampling’s key advantage is that it 
allows the researcher to focus on individuals that will provide the most information about the subject 
under review.  
 
It is expected that the managers will provide a holistic and objective view of the key issues being 
canvassed especially given that they are best positioned as managers of SEC, to comment on matters that 





expected to be subjective enough to disqualify them from providing an honest assessment of the impact of 
the new remuneration guidelines. The identities of the sample population will be protected so that they 
give information willingly and as objective as possible. 
 
1.11 Study Location 
 
This research is a case study of the views of managers of the Swaziland Electricity Company, on the 
impact of remuneration on the performance of the company. It is therefore located within SEC, which is 
domiciled in Mbabane, Kingdom of Swaziland. 
 
1.12 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation will be structured to include the following chapters: - 
 
a) Chapter One – Introduction, background about Swaziland and SEC, the problem statement and 
significance of the study. 
b) Chapter Two – Literature Review with emphasis on remuneration, performance management 
and employee motivation. 
c) Chapter Three – will outline the research methodology used in the study. 
d) Chapter Four – will highlight the research findings and analysis, supported by graphs and tables 
and directly linked to the literature review. 
e) Chapter Five – conclusion and recommendations will be covered in this chapter. 
 
1.13 Limitations of the Research 
 
Any research of this nature, would have certain limitations, particularly given that it is being undertaken 
in a closed environment i.e. case study setting. Findings and lessons from the study, will be extrapolated 
to cover other parastatals given that the pay regulations are not unique to SEC but affect all public 
enterprises in Swaziland generally. Regardless of the value of the feedback from SEC managers, it is not 
necessarily a given that the same factors could be prevalent in other public enterprises. Whilst time 
constraints and resources were the key determinants in restricting this case study to SEC, it is fair to 
conclude that focusing on SEC only has deprived the research of multiple perspectives that would have 





experiences of SEC managers on the impact of the new pay regulations on their performance and that of 
the Company, will be useful feedback to the SEC Board of Directors in making decision on pay issues.  
Furthermore, the researcher is an active employee of the company and has been affected negatively by the 
implementation of the new remunerations regulations. In addition, the managers in the targeted 
population, have also been affected negatively by the new remuneration regulations. In the researcher’s 
view, this may pose concerns of bias. Matters affecting remuneration tend to be very emotive. This is so 
given the reality that most members of an organisation, tend to have very exaggerated views on the value 
of their effort including how such effort should be rewarded.  Nevertheless, the nature of this study is 
subjective in nature. Thus the structure of the questionnaire has been designed to counteract this bias and 
to mitigate it as much as possible. It is however accepted that bias is inherent in employee perceptions as 
predominantly, the intention is to gather views based on the employee’s own experiences and judgement 
on a specific phenomenon.  
 
Lastly, the manner in which the new pay regulations were initially implemented in 2010/11, particularly 
the lack of adequate consultations, lack of clarity on the rationale and criteria used in the categorisation, 
has given rise to the erosion of trust especially on the part of the people it was designed to affect i.e. 
managers of public enterprises. Managers generally distrust the motives of the shareholder in 
implementing the pay regulations. Juxtaposed against how government itself manages pay within 
government particularly with regards to how remuneration for politicians in Swaziland has been 
reformed, this research could not have happened at a worse time. In the researcher’s view, the erosion of 
trust may undermine the effective participation of the managers especially if they entrench perceptions 
that government is unlikely to take their feedback into consideration. It therefore will be vital that the 
researcher’s establishes a fair measure of buy-in so that this exercise is not viewed as an effort in futility. 
In addition to the piloting the questionnaire, the researcher will randomly select participants to attend an 
informal discussion on the need for such a study. It is hoped that through doing so, the participants will 
connect emotionally with the objectives of the research and hence improve their qualitative participation 
in the exercise. 
 
The next chapter will explore the theoretical underpinning of reward, motivation and performance 










The objective of Chapter One, was to provide a context to the research . In this regard, an overview of 
Swaziland was highlighted including key statistics about the country. A historical background of SEC 
was elucidated emphasising the historical performance of the Company and why it was necessary to 
undertake this research, what the objectives are, what motivated the study. In addition, this chapter 
covered how the research will be conducted, focusing on the research design, methodology, how data will 
be collected as well as the sample population. Lastly, Chapter One covered the structure of the 
dissertation as well as limitations of the study.  
 
The next chapter, will deal with a review of the theoretical concepts that underpin the research, with 



























Chapter One basically covered an overview of the study with a brief summary of each of the chapters. In 
addition, the objectives and significance of the study were discussed in detail particularly in the context of 
how the research aims to enrich existing literature on remuneration with specific reference to the 
Swaziland Electricity Company. The purpose of Chapter Two is to explore the theory that underpins the 
concepts of rewards in the context of employee retention, motivation, performance and organisational 
success. This chapter will review literature on pay models utilised to attract and retain employees thus 
improving the performance of a company. Furthermore, the chapter will look into remuneration as a 
motivator in aggregation to the traditional theories of motivation. In the researchers view, it is only 
through fully appreciating the theoretical underpinnings that a proper foundation to meet the objectives of 
the study can be established. Consequently, the information to be explored in this chapter will enrich the 
existing knowledge base of remuneration particularly in public sector organisations, and may result in the 





Within modern day organisations, there is no doubt that many of them are challenged with matters related 
to attracting, motivating and retaining high performing employees. Without highly motivated and 
productive employees, organisations will generally not be able to achieve their objectives nor to grow 
their business in a sustainable and viable manner that outperforms their competitors. As summarised by 
WorldatWork (2007), “from the simplest barter systems of centuries past, to the current complex 
incentive formulas of today, the organisational premise has been the same: provide productivity and 
results to an enterprise, and the enterprise will provide its employees with something of value”, 






Throughout the history of the evolution of organisations, managers have consistently been confronted 
with the question of how to attract and retain highly productive and motivated employees. The evolution 
of the concept of rewards is thus clearly intertwined and interwoven with the history of the evolution of 
organisations themselves, and is underpinned by the battle for talent. As demonstrated through Figure 2.1 
below, as organisations have continued to evolve, so has the notion of rewards - all this being 
underpinned primarily by the need to attract and retain talent. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: The Evolution of Rewards – Source: WorkatWork (2007) Total Rewards Management. The Total Rewards Association 
 
As argued by Jiang et al (2009), modern reward management concepts have therefore developed in the 
context of managing transforming organisations and essentially relate to much more than focusing on the 
contribution of employees to the wellbeing of his/her organisation including their compensation. They 
have also argued that non-direct pay elements have been playing an increasing role in reward structure 
design. “Generally, modern reward management is carried through Total Reward Management which 
matches with the work ethic and pursuit of the present employees, and it is an important reflection of 
emphasizing the relationship between enjoyment of reward elements and performance”, Jiang et al (2009: 
p 178).  
 
A summary of definitions for the key concepts used in this Chapter in the context of reward management, 
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Table 2-1: The Five Phases of Rewards – Source: Jiang, Z. Xiao, Q. Qi, H. Xiao, L. (2009) Total Reward Strategy: A Human Resource 
Management Strategy Going with the Trend of the Times. International Journal of Business and Management, 4 (11), 177 – 183 
The Modalities of Reward Specific Description 
Wage A wage is usually a financial compensation received by a worker in exchange 
of their labour 
Salary A salary is a form of periodic payment from an employer to an employee, 
which may be specified in a contract. It is contrasted with piece wages where 
each job, hour or other unit is paid separately, rather than on a periodic basis 
Compensation Compensation is something similar with pay or salary, typically a monetary 
payment for services rendered, as in an employment. Some benefits may be 
included. 
Total Compensation  Total compensation includes pay, benefits, flexible schedules, education 
assistance, training courses and workplace opportunities to help you get the 
most out of your career and personal life. 
Total Reward Total reward covers all the elements that employees value in working for their 
employer. It emphasizes the integrity of remuneration and is put forward in 
contrast to total compensation. Although at most times it is thought as the 
same as total compensation, total reward remains the new word in the category 
of remuneration or reward 
 
Given the foregoing background, this chapter will address the various components to remuneration and 
how remuneration links to business success. Through the literature review, a basis for understanding the 
rationale for this research will be established.   
 
2.3 Reward and Performance Management: A Theoretical Perspective 
 
This section explores reward management, including more elaborate definitions of the terms used when 
understanding rewards, from various theories. This section will be concluded by offering a critique of all 
theories used.  
 
Why is it that the issue of pay attracts so much emotional responses from people generally? Whether one 
looks at private organisations or public ones, the bottom line is the same – general disdain for decisions 
those in control take with regards to remuneration. Shareholders of private companies have often argued 
that the remuneration of employees in the organisations they own, does not equate to the value they create 
nor the returns they receive from their shareholding. In public organisations, it is worse as people or 
citizens generally view public servants with indifference especially in relation to the remuneration they 
receive. Remuneration is as fascinating in as much as it is complex. As argued by Perkins & White 





the world and organisation, and ways of bringing order to these socio-economic institutions, influenced  
in turn, by their unique character and situations”, Perkins & White (2011: p2).  
 
Thus in order to fully engage with the concept of remuneration, it is necessary to begin by exploring the 
different views and notions people have on a matter as difficult but as necessary as remuneration.  
 
2.3.1 Theory of Reward Management 
 
The work of Perkins & White (2011), underscores the argument that employee compensation, forms a key 
foundation that anchors the employment relationship. To an extent that how remuneration is 
implemented, tends to influence the character and quality of the work relationship and its outcomes. 
Perkins & White (2011) further argue that the term employee compensation, is often used interchangeably 
in most literature with words such as remuneration or reward, and that the term has now generally come 
to be associated with all forms of financial returns, tangible services and benefits employees receive in 
return for the services they render in organisations. Lastly, they put forth the suggestion that employee 
rewards can be differentiated into two, namely extrinsic rewards and intrinsic rewards. Whilst in their 
view, extrinsic rewards relate to the salary, incentive pay and benefits employees receive in recognition 
for the value they contribute in organisations, intrinsic rewards are manifestations of work and 
employment, for example, positive and caring attitude from an employer or even job rotation after 
attaining a specific goal, developmental opportunities, acknowledgement for outstanding work or feelings 
of achievement.  
 
Aktar, Sachu & Ali (2012) also concur with this definition of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards and confirm 
that traditionally, both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards have been used to compensate employees for the 
value they offer their organisations with the assumption that this will then create increased loyalty and 
commitment to that entity. They however also advance the proposition that rewards do not create a lasting 
commitment to an organisation but merely create temporary compliance. Furthermore that when it comes 
to producing lasting change in attitudes and behaviour, rewards are ineffectual in that they work like 
punishment. Once the rewards run out, employees revert back to their old behaviours. Whether or not 
rewards achieve their intended purpose will be investigated in this chapter so that the notion of the inter-
relatedness between rewards, motivation and performance is placed in its proper perspective.  
 
Ballentine et al (2012) aver that the underlying premise in the concept of reward is based on the need to 





employees to fully appreciate their role in the enterprise including the realisation that without them 
playing their part effectively, the enterprise will not exist. Therefore employee reward embodies all the 
principal pillars supporting an employment relationship, a view also espoused by Kessler (2005). 
Zingheim and Shuster (2000: p13) state that there are four reward components that an organisation can 
implement to be effective and efficient and these are outlined in Table 2-1 below. As illustrated in Table 
2-2, it is informative that total reward and pay including enabling the creation of an enabling work 
environment, are fundamental to the concept of reward management.  It is also apparent that in order for 
any organisation to succeed, all these mechanisms should be present in the workplace.  
 
Flowing from the preceding views on what constitutes reward and appreciating the different components 
of reward, one can surmise that reward management encapsulate “the combined actions an employer may 
take to specify at what levels employee reward can be offered, based on what criteria and data, how the 
offer will be regulated over time and how both the intended links between organisational goals and values 
should be understood and acted on by the parties to the employment relationship”, Perkins & White 
(2011: p5).   
 
Zingheim and Schuster (2000) observed that a total rewards strategy has at least four components. 
Therefore, to be truly effective, a reward system should not just be about monetary incentives but must 
also be concerned about non-financial rewards. This view, reflected in Table 2-1 below, complements the 
views for the existence of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivators.  
 
Table 2-2: Total Reward Components: The Better Workforce Deal, Source: Zingheim, P.K. & Schuster, J.R. (2000) Pay People right! 
Breakthrough reward strategies to create great companies.Jossey-Bass,San Francisco.p13) 
Individual Growth 
 
 Investment in people 
 Development and training 
 Performance Management 
 Career Enhancement 
Compelling Future 
 
 Vision and Values 
 Company growth and success 
 Company image and reputation 
 Stakeholder ship 




 Base pay 
 Variable including stocks 





 People focus 
 Leadership 
 Work itself 
 Involvement and Communication 






According to Perkins and White (2011) there are different theoretical approaches to managing employee 
reward all of which can be classified in terms of their emphasis either on structuring reward or on the 
process of reward determination.  
 
The following section reviews at least four (4) alternative theories derived from various disciplines that 
can be utilised to address the basis of reward management.  
  
2.3.1.1 Labour Market Theory 
 
Labour Market Theory is underpinned by the “reality that there is competition for labour in the same way 
that within a capitalist’s society, goods and services are traded in a market”, Perkins and White (2011: 
p35). Thus as Perkins and White continue to argue, whilst employers may want to procure labour at the 
best price, employees as well will attempt to sell their labour within that given market, at the best price. 
As indicated by Black (2002), the supposition is that pay will be fixed in the labour market where the 
demand for workers equates exactly to the supply. This theory, according to Gerhart & Rynes (2003) 
advances the hypothesis that there is little point in employers attempting to differentiate themselves from 
their competitors by paying different or higher wages because, in the final analysis all organisations have 
to pay the same as everyone else and that the effective strategy is to pay what others do.  
 
2.3.1.2 Human Capital Theory 
 
Abercrombie et al (2000) view human capital as another economic theory that is pertinent to reward 
management. This theory is premised on the fact that individuals accrue human capital by investing time 
and money in education, training, experience and other qualities that augment their productive capacity 
and thus are worth something to their employer.  While, all employees bring some skill and experience to 
the performance of their tasks, “accumulated educational achievement and experience give rise to 
differentiation in the level of reward necessary to secure and retain certain people”, Perkins and White 
(2011: p41). Competition prevalent in organisations across national boundaries due to higher labour value 
content, presents a need for reward management system regulation beyond simple market clearing 







2.3.1.3 Efficiency Wage Theory 
 
According to Perkins and White (2011) efficiency wage theory is a managerial strategy to achieve more 
efficient employment contracts over the medium term.  The theory is underpinned by the assumption that 
employers would rather pay higher reward levels than to lose employees who use their human capital to 
secure alternative work at improved rates.  Employers therefore believe it is better to pay higher wages to 
sustain an ongoing relationship, than to lose critical skills to a competitor organisation. Therefore, 
efficiency wages are an investment in organisation specific knowledge to maximise on loyalty and 
minimise opportunistic employee behaviour.  Higher levels of reward are offered to employees in the 
expectation that they will in turn see the higher reward as an incentive to perform better than the external 
market standard.   
 
2.3.1.4 Internal Labour Markets Theory 
 
As advanced by Doeringer (1967) cited in White (2000), the theoretical construct of the internal labour 
market could be explicitly referred to as a processing unit wherein the market functions of determining 
product value, allocating of responsibilities and ensuring that employees are able to perform certain tasks, 
are performed.  It is essentially managed via a unique set of rules which demarcate the limits of the 
internal market and determine its internal structure. The process of recruiting employees into the 
organisation as well as defining work rules, delineate the access points into the internal market. In 
addition, the characteristics of the internal market include the relationship between various jobs for 
purposes of internal mobility and the privileges which accrue to workers within the internal market.  
 
As averred by Hendry (2003), in instances where an organisation wants a constant relationship with their 
personnel, this may be possible if a controlled internal labour market is created and maintained so as to 
insulate some or all the organisations employees from the vagaries of external market forces which 
impact on an organisation’s ability to retain its employees. Examples of internal labour markets would be 
armed forces or police where entry is limited to particular grades.  
 
Having reviewed at least four (4) basic theories of reward, Table 2-3 below, therefore summarises these 








Table 2-3: Comparison of the theories of reward management 




 Within a given labour market, 
labour maximises return 
(purchase of labour at the best 
price) 
 Good for setting minimum 
wages to address socio-
economic challenges  
 In a capitalist environment, 
labour differentiated based on 
skills, qualifications and 
experience 
 Not normal to pay rates 




 Where employees invest in 
better skills set, which in turn 
improves productivity and 
thus they are able to negotiate 
higher wages from a better 
platform 
 Differentiation based on 
overall skills set, 
qualifications and 
experience (simple and 
easier to implement) 
 Labour market is now global & 
cuts geographical boundaries 
and thus poses very difficult 




 Where employers pay higher 
wages to secure continued 
tenure of employees 
 Pay directly correlated to 
increased loyalty – with 
hope for higher 
performance 
 May work towards 
addressing opportunistic 
employee behaviour (spot 
bargaining) 
 Paying higher wages does not 
always result in improved 
productivity 
 Difficult to reverse pay as it 






 Defined by key set of rules 
which demarcate boundary 
 Institutional hiring and work 
rules define access points 
 Works better where 
organisation requires 
constant relationship with 
employees 
 Protects members from 
external market volatility  
 Allows members to have 
extensive knowledge about 
members 
 Internal culture prevents 
spot bargaining over wages 
 Works better in armed forces or 
police with strong hierarchy of 
control 
 Difficult to apply in other work 
situations 
 
From the above discussion on reward management it may be concluded that a multifaceted approach has 
to be followed in understanding reward management.  
 
The consequent section will address performance management, a process which is one of the principal 
elements of reward management.    
 
2.3.2 Theory of Performance Management 
 
A clear definition of performance management has not been established because the meaning varies from 
one organisation to another. According to Gronfors (1996), the term means different things to different 
people depending on their position in the organisation. A number of authors have however investigated 





performance management will assist this study in contextualising how the performance of employees in 
an organisation is influenced by amongst other things, reward and motivation.  
 
Swanepoel et al (2003) argue that performance management is a continuous practice that involves the 
planning, managing, reviewing, rewarding and development of performance, through entrenching the 
culture of performance appraisals as a key part of a supervisor’s responsibility in an organisation so as to 
achieve the overall goals of that entity. They argue that whilst performance appraisals are the actual 
system of measuring performance, performance management is much broader encompassing not only 
measuring performance, but allocating adequate resources, problem solving, facilitating employee 
feedback and enabling integrated planning, to achieve business success. As a concept, performance 
management surfaced in the late 1980s, initially as an extension of performance appraisal, a practice used 
to evaluate an individual employees’ past performance.   
 
There is thus general consensus amongst a number of authors, for example, Lindholm (2000), and 
Anguinis (2009), that performance appraisal is but one of the various elements that are a key feature of 
the continuous performance management process. Vance & Paik (2006) and Briscoe & Claus (2008), 
actually aver that this process also involves other critical procedures such as the communication of 
company strategy through individual objective setting, setting performance standards, measuring actual 
performance against those standards and continuously re-designing jobs to achieve the overall objectives 
of the organisation. Moreover, job design, feedback and monitoring, links to training and development 
planning and more importantly, employee compensation. 
 
Consequently, it can be deduced as Aguinis (2009) does, that performance management is a method of 
identifying, measuring and developing the performance of individuals and teams and aligning 
performance with the strategic goals of the organisation. Cascio (2006) agrees and actually underscores 
three key elements as underpinning performance management: goals, measures and assessment. Engle et 
al (2008), whilst concurring with this view, also contends that performance management typically also 
includes feedback to employees at all levels including consequences for employees as well as the 
development of skills. Tahvanainen & Suutari (2005) on the other hand suggests that strong goal setting 
and additional customary appraisals are significant components of performance management system that 
may also comprise performance related pay. 
 
Organisations typically appoint employees so that they perform tasks with clear goals that are aligned to 





Rosenzweig (2006) contends that a performance evaluation system should incorporate developmental, 
result-based and behavioural measures. Performance measurement systems were traditionally established 
as a catalyst of monitoring and maintaining organisational control. As argued by Amaratunga & Baldry 
(2002), a lack of proper performance measurement can be a barrier to change and improvement. 
Skrivastava, (2005) concurs and avers that measurements actually ensure a connection between individual 
employees, with the vision and goals of the organisation. Whilst on one hand, this assists the organisation 
to attain excellence service levels, on the other hand is enables the organisation to achieve employee 
satisfaction and the personal growth of employees.  
 
Accordingly Corcoran (2006) argues that performance management is about instituting a culture in which 
employees and teams take responsibility for the development of their own skills and the achievement of 
continuously evolving goals and objectives. Furthermore, that performance management should not be 
viewed separately but must embrace every component in which the company is organised; from strategy 
to daily operational issues and how to measure the efficiency of these efforts. Consequently, Vance & 
Paik (2006) contend that performance management can be understood as a cyclical process which leads to 
changes rather than a stagnant activity.   
 
A typical performance management process involves the steps reflected in Figure 2-2, hereunder: 
 
 
Figure 2-2: An Integrated Performance Management Cycle - Source: Swanepoel, B. et al (2003), South African Human Resource Management – 
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The above process highlights the following steps: 
 
a) Planning Performance: setting Key Performance Areas (KPAs), objectives and standards that 
are linked to corporate strategy (mission, vision and values) and development plans 
b) Maintaining Performance: monitoring, feedback, coaching and mentoring and regular 
interactions regarding goal achievement 
c) Reviewing Performance: formal feedback done periodically normally twice a year and rating the 
performance. 
d) Rewarding of Performance: directly linking rewards (pay increases, bonuses, and incentives) to 
the performance results. This step may also encompass targeted training and development, 
disciplinary action and counseling (where appropriate and necessary), manpower planning and 
succession planning as well as reviewing the effectiveness of the performance management cycle. 
 
2.3.1.2 Performance Management versus Performance Appraisal 
 
Snell and Bohlander (2007) define performance appraisal as a process, normally performed by a 
supervisor to a subordinate, designed to help employees understand their roles, objectives, expectations 
and performance success. They also define performance management as the process of creating a work 
environment in which people can perform to the best of their abilities. Mondy & Noe (2007) define 
performance appraisal as a recognised system of review and evaluation of individual or team based 
performance. The focus of performance appraisal systems in most firms remains on the individual 
employees. Therefore and as averred by Prasad (2006), performance appraisal is considered as the key 
element or significant step in managing performance generally.  
 
Vlachos (2008) notes that many scholars consider performance management as the new name given to the 
well-established concept of performance appraisal and that there is actually no difference between the 
two. This is true to a certain extent given that in most organisations, the words performance management 
and performance appraisals are used synonymously. Nonetheless, performance management is clearly 
more than a new name for performance appraisal. Performance management on the other hand is a 
cohesive process of performance planning, performance appraisal, performance feedback and 
performance counseling. Swanepoel et al (2003) for example, argue that there is more to performance 
management than there is to performance appraisals in that in the latter, the emphasis in on performance 
ratings and measurement yet in the former, the emphasis in on planning objectives in alignment to the 





accountability. They furthermore argue that whilst performance appraisals are an end in itself, in the 
integrated performance management, the process is directly linked to strategic planning. As suggested by 
Pareek & Rao (2006), most organisations prefer to refer to their systems as performance management 
rather than performance appraisal and that this is the most welcome change of the last fifteen years. 
 
2.3.1.2 Pay for Performance 
 
Having defined rewards in the context of rewards management and fully appreciating the performance 
management process and principles, let us now proceed to review how both these two concepts come 
together. Whilst organisational processes may differ, ultimately, the link between these two critical 
processes, can best be illustrated in Figure 2.3 below:  
 
 
Figure 2-3: Pay for Performance – Source: WorkatWork (2007) Total Rewards Management - The Total Rewards Association. pGR4 -5.3 
 
As reflected in WorkatWork (2007), each of the steps described above, are summarised below: 
 
a) Establish Measures – the organisation must define its measures of performance and link this 
with whatever performance management system it uses. There are a number of such systems that 
can be used for this purpose and include: balanced scorecards, shareholder value analysis, activity 
based costing, competitor benchmarking, etc. In reality, when reviewing the type of system that 








b) Communicate links – communication is the foundation for the success of most people 
interventions. As such the link between the established measures and the employee’s performance 
assessment, must be clearly articulated and known up front by employees. 
c) Assess the performance – this is the part wherein based on evidence, the employee’s 
performance is evaluated. Performance evaluation takes into consideration issues of individual 
performance, team performance as well as organisation performance and is aligned to the agreed 
upon performance measures. In addition and depending on the organisation’s appetite, 
assessments entail both informal and formal feedback, 360 degree assessments or feedback, 
reviewing actual performance against set targets/objectives and to a large extent, also includes 
coaching and mentoring. 
 
Once the performance is measured, it is then aligned with the agreed and/or defined incentives. As 
suggested by WorkatWork (2007), rewards in this regard when linked with performance, can be any one 
or combination of the following: 
 
a) Performance based pay – where the reward is directly linked to the achievement of agreed 
performance targets i.e. commission based salaries; 
b) Performance based merit increases – where in addition to fixed pay, an employee’s pay increase, 
is then linked his/her ability to achieve defined performance levels; 
c) Performance based incentive – where in addition to fixed pay, an employee is rewarded with a 
lump sum once off payment in recognition to him/her having achieved defined performance 
levels. 
 
In the foregoing sections, the theories and institutional approaches to reward management and 
performance management were discussed. These theories act as the reference point for the subsequent 
sections in this chapter and the study as a whole.   
 
2.4 The Legal, Employment Relationships And Reward Management 
 
Any study of remuneration and its impact on performance, will be incomplete without the review of the 
legal and employment relations including regulatory developments that affect reward management 







2.4.1 The Legal Regulation of Reward Management 
 
According to Perkins & White (2011), every reward strategy is implemented within the context of the 
legal, ethical, employment relations and labour market environment in which the organisation operates. In 
addition and as advanced by some authors, “no country operates in isolation and therefore international 
bodies and issues greatly impact on a country…of particular interest however are the laws governing 
employment relations which fall under the auspices of the International Labour Organisation”, Nel et al 
(2004: p81). ”, Brewster et al (2008) concurs with this view and argues that the world is becoming 
increasingly global resulting in human resources managers needing to educate themselves with not only 
their own regulatory framework but also those of other countries. Most countries have at some form of 
legislation or regulation that govern remuneration and general conditions of employment. Such legislation 
normally sets out minimum terms and conditions of service that constrain employers in designing their 
own remuneration systems.   
 
In terms of what a number of authors have submitted, for example, Perkins & White (2011), Nel et al 
(2004), Brewster et al (2008), there are at least three main ways in which an organisation reward strategy 
may be limited and/or controlled:  
 
a) Firstly, by the constraint of statute or legal regulations which govern employment terms and 
conditions; 
b) Secondly, through voluntary agreements that are entered into by organisations and industry 
unions, normally via the process of consultation and negotiation. In employment terms, this is 
referred to as collective bargaining; and 
c) Lastly, through involuntarily being subjected to the dictates of the external labour market.  
 
2.4.2 Collective Bargaining 
 
According to Perkins and White (2011) employers may choose to consult with individual employees or 
groups of employees about the design and any changes to the reward system or they may decide that it is 
management’s prerogative to decide on these matters. On the other hand, where an employer recognises a 
trade union, this normally implies that there will be a more formal relationship including collective 
bargaining over pay conditions. Gennard & Judge (2002) define collective bargaining as a method of 
determining the price at which employee services are bought and sold through a system of industrial 





relationship. In practice, collective agreements are applied to all employees within a collective bargaining 
unit, whether union members or not.  It is also the case that organisations that do not recognise trade 
unions may still follow the collective agreement applying to workers in their sector or industry.  For this 
reason, collective bargaining covers a larger proportion of the workforce than trade union membership.   
 
As argued by Gennard & Judge (2002), four (4) prerequisites for collective bargaining are usually 
observed:  
 
a) There must be organisation on the part of the buyers and sellers of labour. 
b) There must be substantive agreement to bargain. 
c) There must be procedural agreement. 
d) Both the buyers and sellers of labour must be able to impose sanctions upon each other so that 
they can re-assess their positions towards each other in terms of demands they make to each 
other. 
 
Perkins and White (2011) assert that the choice of employers whether to bargain collectively with trade 
unions is often constrained.  In certain parts of the economy, especially in the public sector, trade unions 
are well represented among the workforce and even managers may be union members.  
 
Whilst the major regulatory and contextual limits on the design of the reward system have been discussed, 
there is however the need to further explore the concepts of reward and how it is linked to other critical 
areas of skills and competency based pay, performance based pay as well as how these can motivate 
employee retention.   
 
2.5 Pay systems – motivation and retention 
 
It is not in doubt that employees constitute one of the driving forces that contribute to the success and 
sustainability of any company. It has also been advanced in the preceding discussions that proper 
administration of remuneration systems such as pay or performance and pay for skills and competencies, 
allows employees to be productive. Thus, if employees are productive this enhances the growth and 






The following section will therefore explore how financial rewards are utilised in encouraging and 
retaining employees to stay within a company and thus effectively contributing towards improving the 
company’s success.   
 
2.5.1 Base pay 
 
Swanepoel et al (2003) define base pay as employment based because payment is incurred for the job. 
They further suggest that an employee is allocated a particular job and is rewarded for that job regardless 
of performance, and that base-pay design covers four basic tools: job analysis, job evaluation, market 
surveys, and pay structuring. These will be briefly discussed below:  
 
a) Job analysis: According to WorkatWork (2007), this is a process of identifying and documenting 
the duties of a job through the use of a job description. A job description is an essential factor 
when making pay decisions because in the absence of clear job descriptions, employees feel work 
overload, role conflict and ambiguity.   
b) Job Evaluation: As suggested by Swanepoel et al (2003) job evaluation involves the grading of 
positions using job specifications that flow from the job analysis process. Positions are ranked in 
order of importance thus determining the relative worth of each job within a given organisation. 
Job evaluation is also the basis for the design of pay structures which must be internally equitable 
and aligned to the goals of the organisation. 
c) Market Survey: WorkatWork (2007), suggests that when organisations offer salaries that are 
similar to what other employers in the same industry pay, in order to attract, retain and motivate 
employees, the use of market surveys helps organisations to make salary comparisons by 
structuring their pay levels on what other employers in the same industry pay their employees. 
d) Pay Structuring: Swanepoel et al (2003) argue that pay structuring occurs when organisations 
use information that is obtained from the job evaluation exercise and from market surveys to 
establish differentiated pay rates to be used per grade. 
 
Shields (2007) and WorkatWork (2007), concur that base pay, also referred to as fixed pay, is guaranteed 
a employment and is paid in return for work done. Base pay is normally not dependent on an employee’s 
performance. Base pay is determined by an organisation to take into consideration, their philosophy on 
pay, market conditions and affordability as well as external pay market realities. In most organisations, 
base pay is used to determine pay increases, pay incentives or any ex-gratia payment that is expressed as a 






2.5.2 Skills and competency based pay 
 
Armstrong & Murlis (1994) as well as Shields (2007) argue that skills and competency based pay is a 
methodology that some organisations use to reward employees for the dexterity of their skills and their 
ability to use them effectively in order to achieve the objectives of that enterprise. It certainly can be 
argued that skills and competency are critical ingredients for an employee’s value add in an organisation.  
Therefore, it can be extrapolated that the more employees possess both these attributes, the higher their 
potential value to the organisation particularly if the skills and competency are applied correctly and in 
line with the organisations expectations. Thus in organisations that utilise skills and competency based 
remuneration, this is normally done through paying for the horizontal acquisition of skills and the vertical 
development of skills needed to operate at a higher level by undertaking a wider range of tasks. There are 
a number of reasons why organisations gravitate towards this type of pay method. One of the key reasons 
is to ensure that organisations can keep pace with the rate in which technology evolves as well as 
improvements in production methods, thus requiring a high degree of flexibility from employees. Homan 
(2000) certainly agrees with the emphasis on skills and competency based pay. He argues that this method 
of remuneration is a good catalyst for changing organisational culture to one that puts value on its 
employees in that it accentuates the development of self-value amongst employees and increases the 
levels of job satisfaction, which in turn is the foundation for employee retention. Shields (2007) and 
Byars & Rue (2004) agree that skills based pay inspires self-driven individuals to continuously update 
their overall skills in line with the changing needs of the organisation. In addition, they argue that it 
enhances multi-skilling and places a premium on up-to-date skills that drive bottom line value, thus 
directly contributing towards innovation and creativity amongst employees. Thus employees, who 
subscribe to this reward method, become a critical part of that organisation. 
 
According to Armstrong & Murlis (1994) not all organisations however, are capable of sustaining skills 
based pay. Therefore, organisations must be encouraged to fully apply themselves on the suitability of 
this payment method before it is executed. They advance the proposition that skills and competency based 
pay is more appropriate for organisations with the following conditions:  
 
a) Technologically inclined organisations where the level and range of skills needed is high.  
b) High technology companies such as the mobile manufacturing companies faced with innovative 
technologies. 






From the preceding section it can be concluded that that appropriate management of skills and 
competency pay method can convey affirmative results for organisations.  By implementing this pay 
system an organisation can control employee turnover and enhance commitment levels.  Competency 
based pay also inspires employees to improve their skills in line with organisational objectives and 
values.   
 
2.5.3 Performance based pay 
 
Flannery et al (1996) advance the argument that skills and competency pay systems are fundamental to 
the changing values of the organisation, but they do not address the fluctuating needs of people. Pay for 
performance such as bonuses and sales commission are general methods utilised solely for managers and 
sales staff.  In their view, these types of pay method have evolved from being just for marginal groups to 
recognising everyone in the organisation, as the success of the organisation is not dependent on any one 
employee. Wilson (1995) concurs as he contends that traditionally, reward systems did not favour the 
direct linking of pay with performance. Skills based pay concepts have thus changed the remuneration 
landscape. He argues that pay for performance has gained prominence amongst managers because of the 
need to clearly distinguish those employees who through their efforts and toil, are a cut amongst the rest. 
Outstanding employees are thus encouraged by pay differentiation thus increasing their motivation and 
retention levels. 
 
Niranjana & Pattanayak (2005) agrees that performance related pay is part of the key policy options and 
new approaches to human resources management in the public sector around the world. Furthermore that 
the use of incentives like bonuses or commission assumes that employee’s actions are related to their 
skills and ability to achieve significant long term goals, even though many organisations, by choice or 
tradition or contract ,allocate incentives on non-performance criteria, rewards should be regarded as a 
pay-off performance. According to Flannery et al (1996), employers argue that traditional pay systems 
impede growth and success of an organisation and that this has incited organisations to contemplate new 
and improved compensation resolutions that manoeuvres and supports the new emphasis on organisation 
values such as quality, customer service, teamwork and productivity. They argue further that this change 
is fundamentally inclined towards performance-based and variable pay strategies. Farnham & White 
(2011) however suggest that even where performance-based and variable pay strategies are in place, there 
is still much debate about the suitability of such strategies and whether the remuneration or incentives 





private companies where a larger proportion of pay is increasingly linked to some form of incentive or 
share scheme, which concept however, has in itself, come under severe criticism especially with the 
advent of corporate scandals on incentive schemes and share options.  
 
Through the foregoing review of the various payment systems that can attract and retain employees, it is 
evident that organisations are tasked to choose a system that will be appropriate for them and be aligned 
with its objectives and goals.   
 
In addition to remuneration, employees are known to stay in organisations even if the pay is low. What 
motivates an employee to stay in an organisation, is a key objective of this study. The subsequent section 
will therefore review reward systems and processes influence and/or affect an employee’s motivation 
with specific reference to employee retention.   
 
2.6 The theory of motivation in relation to reward management 
 
According to Aktar, Sachu and Ali (2012) rewards constitute one of the significant components that 
motivate employees to contribute their best effort towards generating innovative ideas that lead to better 
business functionality and further improve company performance both financially and non-financially.  
Aktar, Sachu and Ali (2012) further assert that many researchers affirm that employees give their utmost 
effort when they have a feeling that their efforts will be rewarded by management and that there are 
various elements that affect employee performance for instance, working conditions, worker and 
employee relationship, training and development opportunities, job security and the company’s policies 
and procedures for rewarding employees. This section will therefore review the various traditional 
theories of motivation i.e. Equity Theory Expectancy Theory and Goal Setting Theory, and how these are 
related to reward management. 
 
Nel et al (2004) argue that motivation is both intentional and directional. Intentional in the sense that it 
refers to choices people make based on their personal circumstances including taking action regardless of 
the consequences. It is also directional specifically with respect to the existence of an overriding 
imperative to achieve specific goals. In other words, a motivated person is consistently cognisant of what 
they intend to achieve and thus will channel their energy towards reaching the desired end result. Hence 
the conclusion by Net et al (2004) that motivation is the most fundamental aspect amongst all factors that 
affect employee performance and that motivation is an accumulation of different processes which 






Given that a number of the authors referred to in the foregoing text support the notion that not only is the 
motivation of employees enabled by properly structured reward systems, the remuneration itself is 
incomplete, if it is not designed to motivate employees to perform at the maximum potential, it is thus 
necessary for purposes of this research to review some theories of motivation. Reviewing some of the 
theories of motivation, will help the researcher clearly highlight why it is vital that managers in 
organisations must understand employee behaviour and how it is influenced by motivation. These 
theories are discussed below.   
 
2.6.2 Equity Theory 
 
According to Armstrong & Murlis (1994), in Equity Theory employees compare their pay with what 
other employees get as their pay. Satisfaction with pay is linked with the pay employees receive from 
their job equated with the amount acquired by others. The theory also pre-supposes that “pay satisfaction 
is hinged on the difference between the actual pay received by employees and what they perceive should 
have been received”, Armstrong & Murlis (1994: p38). Equity Theory is necessary to review as part of 
this research given that it emphasizes the view that employees do not view the rewards they receive in 
isolation of what occurs to others. Employees do compare the subjectivity of their rewards relative to 
what other employees receive. Any reward system must therefore by design, pass the principle of 
objectivity for it to have credibility amongst employees. This is the value of the Equity Theory. 
 
2.6.3 Expectancy Theory 
 
As advocated by Guest (2002), an ideal reward and compensation system may consider the principles of 
the Expectancy Theory. This theory suggests that in certain instances, employees are more likely to be 
motivated to perform to higher levels of productivity when they perceive a strong relationship between 
their own performance and the reward they receive. Kalleberg & Moody (1994) and Huselid (1995) also 
agree with this view i.e. that the compensation system (e.g. profit sharing) contributes to performance by 
linking the interest of employees to those of the team and the organisation, thereby enhancing effort and 
performance. They all argue that organisations should take time to fully appreciate what drives their 
employees and what do they need to pay special attention to. Specifically, that organisations must pay 
close scrutiny to the following:  
a) That for employees to be motivated, line managers must establish a clear link between effort and 





b) That people are not the same hence the need for innovation and creativity in designing incentives 
given that employees are not motivated by the same drivers; and 
c) Organisations can improve ‘expectancy’ by developing employees to eliminate any barriers to 
superior performance.   
 
The underlying principle of the Expectancy Theory as argued by Lawler (2003) is that people are 
motivated by the promise of rewards that is linked to a specific goal. The theory is based on the 
knowledge that there are huge differences among people in their needs and as a result in the importance 
they attach to rewards. 
 
2.6.4 Goal Setting Theory 
 
Locke & Latham (2006) argues that this theory explains through a focus on the quality of performance 
objectives, how effort increases. The more the objectives are limited, clear and concise, the more the 
employee will be motivated to achieve them. Goal Setting Theory complements the Expectancy Theory in 
that it too links rewards to the attainment of specific goals, confirming that clearly articulated goals are 
the main basis why employees are motivated to achieve them. Goal Setting Theory has made 
understanding motivation, much easier given its simplicity and clear relationship between effort, 
productivity and reward.  
 
2.6.5 Overview of all three theories 
 
Having reviewed the Equity Theory, Expectancy Theory and Goal Setting Theory, it is also important that 
we compare and contrast them so as to fully appreciate their significance and value. This will also ensure 
that an organisation’s choice of a reward system, at the very least addresses the key elements of these 
theories given that it has been argued in the preceding chapters that reward systems must have a clear 












Table 2-4: Comparison of the above theories of motivation 
Theory Key Features Advantages Limitations 
Equity 
Theory 
 Equal pay for 
equal work 
 If pay perceived 
to be unfair, 
employees may 
leave 
 If all the underlying 
variables are the same 
(qualifications, skills and 
work output), then it is a 
fair and consistent way of 
paying salaries (base can 
be easily justifiable) 
 Forces organisations to 
apply consistency and 
fairness in pay (even 
though legal 
considerations have made 
this mandatory) 
 If employees perceive their work to 
be the same but earn differently, 
may result in employees seeking 
greener pastures 
 Reality is that employees are not the 
same even if their skills set is the 
same, their impact differs 
 Merely paying employees based on 
the same set of skills or 
qualifications without a 
consideration of their attitude or 
general demeanour, may also result 
in alienation of some 
Expectancy 
Theory 
 Advocates for a 
strong link 
between pay and 
performance 
 Links interests 








 Where reward system 
consists of base and 
variable pay, it is more 
justifiable to use (for the 
variable portion) 
 Emphasis team work and 
organisational cohesion 
given that goals are 
achieved in most 
instances where there is 
complete alignment 
between employees and 
the organisation.  
 Linking pay essentially with 
business objectives, assumes that 
pay will remain a changing variable.  
 If it was concerned with incentives, 
then it does make sense and in 
reality is used by most organisation 
(i.e. bonuses) 
 Otherwise the principle of 
guaranteed pay would pose 
challenges in this regard as you will 
end up paying even if that specific 




 Where goals are 










 Complements Expectancy 
Theory through the direct 
correlation between 
employee effort, quality 
of goals and rewards 
 Goals that can be 
realistically achieved, 
engender more effort 
from employees (given 
the promise of stated 
rewards) 
 Whilst realistic goals make the 
effort of achieving them simpler, 
not all goals can be broken down 
into ‘low hanging fruits’. 
 Given that employees are not the 
same nor have the same character 
traits, some high potential 
employees can be discouraged by 
goals that are too simplistic and 
achievable.  
 Stretch targets sometimes challenge 
and motivates on their own 
 
No one theory of the four that have been reviewed as shown in Table 2-4 above, is more superior than the 
other. Instead, organisations with a combination of these theories, have a better chance of getting it right 
given that employees are not the same and the contexts they operate in changes continuously. When 








2.7 Relevance of the theories of reward and performance management to the objectives of 
the study 
 
It has been argued by some authors that reward management is a powerful means of communicating value 
to employees in a manner that underscores direct reward versus criteria which is regulated over time and 
is linked to the business objectives of that organisation. Others however, argue that there is a minimal 
relationship between how a company remunerates its employees and its productivity. The remuneration of 
executives as an example, has come under extreme scrutiny in recent years. The reasons for this are 
various and include; executives being paid high salaries when the share price of the companies they are 
employed to grow, dividends to shareholders not meeting expectations when managers bonuses are 
continue to grow etc. Some commentators have also advanced the argument that the reason executives get 
paid salaries that are not related to the value they supposedly create in the entities they manage, is because 
of lack of effective oversight by Boards of Directors including their inability to hold managers fully 
accountable. They also attribute this to the tendency of directors in Boards to be more loyal to the 
executive team that to shareholders, as they attribute their election into the Boards to them and not the 
shareholders. This has resulted in increased pressure from Boards of Directors to reign in executive pay. 
Thus shareholders are increasingly demanding Boards to demonstrate value add and to link this to various 
long term incentives. Given recent experiences with corporate performances, share schemes and share 
options, it is in the best interest of shareholders to increase their influence over Boards of Directors and 
the executives of the enterprise, as a means of protecting the long-term sustainability of the company. 
Board members qualifications and independence from management, are now very critical corporate 
governance imperatives. Long term incentives and share options, are now critical agenda items in 
shareholder meetings. Improved shareholder activism and effective oversight to Boards of Directors, 
improves accountability and protects the long terms interests of shareholders.  
 
From the preceding review of theories, it has been advanced that the enhancement of performance is 
developed at the point of contact with the organisation and is re-inforced throughout an employee’s tenure 
with an organisation. Furthermore, that performance management occurs within a specific organisation 
framework that includes performance processes, reward architecture, monitoring metrics and leadership 
capability. 
 
Drawing from the rich literature that is available on both the topics of remuneration and performance 
management, and as highlighted in Chapter One, this research seeks to contribute towards a better 





this study is that the Government of Swaziland introduced guidelines on executive remuneration in 2010 
on all public enterprises including the Swaziland Electricity Company. Further guidelines introduced in 
2011, froze pay increases for two years to 2012. Additional guidelines were issued in July 2013 
ostensibly to update the 2010 guidelines. As has been demonstrated comprehensively in Chapter One, the 
guidelines issued by the Government of Swaziland have resulted in the following: 
 
a) None of the instruments introduced by Government from 2010 to date, are premised on any clear 
strategic intent or at the very least, any theoretical underpin.  
b) The remuneration of executives is not designed to improve performance given that a review of 
the guidelines, does not expressly seek to link pay and performance. As argued by the 
proponents of Expectancy Theory and Goal Setting Theory, there should be: 
 
o A clear alignment of performance and the rewards (instrumentality) and managers should 
communicate to employees the behaviours that will be rewarded. SEC for example, has 
adopted the Balanced Scorecard performance management system which improves goal 
setting, line of sight and makes performance contracting much easier. In addition, SEC 
had developed a bonus system that rewards performance at three (3) levels i.e. company 
performance, divisional or departmental performance and individual performance. 
However, the new pay regulations have introduced stringent caps at the top of the 
organisation i.e. at executive level. These caps have unfortunately resulted in an un-even 
pay structure and undermined the implementation of the new performance management 
and bonus systems.  
o Rewards should be created to meet different individuals’ needs. This is not so much with 
regards to actual pay as this will be too costly, but with respect to some elements of pay. 
For an example, employees at the lower level are comfortable with pay levels agreed 
upon at collective bargaining forums. However, at professional or management levels, it 
becomes necessary to build in value based pay elements to recognise specific skills and to 
retain critical skills.  
o Managers should increase expectancy by training employees to be more efficient and 
eliminating any barriers to performance. The duty of managers is to create an enabling 
environment for employees to work to their full potential. Where this is achieved, it must 





o Performance objectives if clearly articulated to employees, would result in increased 
motivation, which will engender more loyalty to that organisation particularly if meeting 
these objectives, will result in clear rewards. 
 
Given that the study aims to contribute towards a better understanding of the impact of remuneration on 
the performance of PE’s in general as well as to enrich the knowledge base of the remuneration policies 
of PE’s which in the author’s view, may be useful input into the development of a more sustainable 
regulatory approach to remuneration of PE’s in Swaziland, an appreciation of the theories of 
remuneration and how they affect the motivation of employees, is a critical building block in study. The 
extent to which the new pay regulations introduced by the Government of Swaziland have impacted on 
the performance of the Swaziland Electricity Company and the retention of employees, is therefore the 




The objective of Chapter Two was to provide an overview of the existing literature related to reward 
management and performance management as a whole, how both concepts are grounded in the legal 
context, how pay systems are used to motivate and retain employees and what theoretical principles 
underpin the concept of motivation. This objective has been realized given that reward management and 
performance management, have been contextualized within the theoretical and empirical perspectives in 
aggregation to the concepts of pay systems and motivation. Ultimately an organisation’s choice of reward 
systems will affect how the employees perform, how they perceive the organisation they work for and 
whether or not it is adequate enough for them to remain motivated and working for the organisation. 
Whether companies use the base pay approach only or whether their pay system is based on the 
competency model or whether their pay is based on performance, or a combination of all these systems, 
will ultimately determine the extent to which it is successful in achieving its objectives.  
 
Given the sophistication of the employee in today’s work environment, an appreciation of the drivers of 
motivation is a necessary competence for all managers. Issues of pay equity where employees do not 
perceive their remuneration to be fair, can greatly undermine organisational cohesion and employee 
loyalty. Similarly assuming that all employees have the same needs as the Maslow’s Theory does, may 
not necessarily be accurate or beneficial particularly given that we now know as indicated through the 
Expectancy Theory, that there are huge differences among people in their needs and as a result in the 





unemployment, calls for more innovative measures to improve the motivation of employees. For an 
example, do employees stay in jobs because of improved engagement levels with their organisation? Do 
they stay because of good pay systems or excellent wellness programmes? Or do they choose to stay 
because alternative jobs are hard to come by particularly where most economies, Swaziland included, are 
not experiencing adequate economic growth? Whatever the reasons, employees remain critical to the 
success of organisations. Leaders and/or managers are even more vital given the sophistication of the 
modern employee and the complexity of managing and leading modern day organisations. In the 
researcher’s view, organisations that will be able to remain viable and sustainable in the long term, will 
succeed amongst other reasons, because of the way and manner it treats all its employees, managers 
included.  
 
























3.1. Introduction  
 
This research study is focused on examining the extent to which new government guidelines on pay for 
executives introduced from 2010, have impacted on the performance of the Swaziland Electricity 
Company Limited (SEC). The study will examine the observations of senior managers of SEC, solicit 
their understanding of how the pay regulations were developed including their impact on themselves as 
individual employees as well as on the organisation as a whole. Their views on the presence of a direct 
relationship between remuneration in general and performance in particular, are of vital importance to this 
research. Finally, their views will be analysed against the performance of the Company before and after 
the introduction of the regulations on executive pay. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
Whilst the preceding chapter dealt with the existing literature on remuneration, performance management 
and employee motivation, this chapter will focus on the methodological issues relating to conducting this 
research study. It will also discuss how the research was conducted with of SEC managers on the key 
issues of remuneration and its impact on performance in Swaziland.  
 
Research design according to Collis & Hussey (2003), principally entails articulating the process a 
researcher will use in order to get the most valid findings and includes designing a comprehensive plan to 
achieve the research objectives. Terre Blanche & Durrheim (2002) emphasize that in research design not 
only must the research plan be properly highlighted, it must also cover how the researcher intends to 
collect and analyse the data. Principally, this study utilised a mixed method of undertaking research 
including using principles of case study research. These methods of inquiry allowed the researcher to 
generate in-depth accounts of the issues and principles related to the remuneration model of SEC. The 
research considered the perspective of managers of the SEC in Swaziland. Data collection took into 
consideration questions that relate to the employee’s opinions and feelings about the remuneration 
phenomenon and the impact (or lack of it) in their jobs, including their retention within the company. This 





chapter will cover data collection instruments, quality control and data analysis. The chapter concludes 
with detailed discussion of the coherence of the methodology and the conceptual frameworks. 
 
3.3. Research Methodology    
 
In the introduction, it was advanced that this study is an assessment of the perceptions of SEC managers 
on the new remuneration guidelines, how according to their understanding, these were formulated, and 
how they perceive the new guidelines have impacted on their performance and retention within the 
company. The perspectives of employers are based on this premise. It is for this reason that both 
qualitative and quantitative frameworks were considered. The reasons for utilising a mixed method of 
research design are discussed below.  
 
To begin with, a qualitative interpretive approach enabled the researcher to get an in-depth understanding 
of how employees view the new remuneration package and its impact on their work as well as retention 
within SEC. Problems identified by the study are appropriate for qualitative research. As argued by Patton 
(2005), qualitative research explores what meaning people give to phenomena in their lives. Thus the 
understanding as well as the process of inquiry, are suitable for qualitative exploration.  
 
In addition to the foregoing, quantitative research searches for universal explanations for phenomena. For 
example, scientific explanations, if correct, are assumed to apply equally well to all instances of the same 
problem. Explanation in quantitative research emphasises the quantification of outcomes, generalisability 
and prediction. This is quite different to the context-based nature of explanations from most qualitative 
research, where researchers often qualify their statements as applying only to the example under study. 
Quantitative social research involving the use of statistical measurement is familiar to the majority of 
people working in the human resource management and is suitable for investigating a phenomenon of this 
nature. The methods to collect data through questionnaires will ensure this “quality of understanding” is 
comprehensively ascertained.  
 
Furthermore and as suggested by Babbie & Mouton (2001), qualitative research has also been used 
because it generates knowledge of events and situations by trying to understand what they mean to 
people. This enables the researcher to interpret findings and come up with recommendations on how the 






This study is also exploratory in nature in that it is being undertaken to gain a deeper understanding into 
the phenomena of the new pay regulations introduced by the Government that affect all public enterprises 
in Swaziland. As advanced by Babbie (2010) the need for such qualitative studies generally comes about 
as a result of the lack of basic information on an area of concern or alternatively, in order to become 
conversant with a new situation. Furthermore that qualitative research is primarily inductive, specific 
questions that were put to the SEC respondents, were therefore designed to obtain raw data as well as 
establish patterns. Based on the established trends, conclusions or theories (ibid.), will be firmed up. 
Thus, this study used this premise to understand the employee’s perspectives in order to get a deeper 
sense of how they viewed the new remuneration model(s) for PE’s. In this way new knowledge and 
conclusions will be generated.  
 
The qualitative approach is embedded in the interpretive framework. As suggested by Radnor (2001), the 
purpose of explanatory research is to elucidate how explanations and considerations are expressed and 
given importance in real life circumstances. Furthermore, gaining in-depth understanding of how 
employers make meaning of the new remuneration guidelines and their impact on their daily work is a 
process that involves the use of multiple strategies to collect data in order to make sense of this 
phenomenon. These multiple methods are interpretive practices. As averred by Denzin & Lincoln (2003), 
the multiple methods create a picture of how we see the world, transforming it into a variety of 
illustrations including field notes, interviews, observations and conversations amongst others. Although, 
these reasons do not provide an exhaustive definition and outline of interpretive research, they however 
provide general requirements that this study meets. 
 
3.4. Research Approaches/Paradigm  
 
Whilst the researcher utilised the mixed method as highlighted in the foregoing, this was anchored in the 
case study paradigm. SEC was used as the case study as opposed to making conclusions drawn from all 
the PE’s in Swaziland. The views of the SEC managers have been extrapolated to have resonance in all 
PE’s generally. Yin (2009) emphasized that focused research creates the foundation for researchers to 
make an all-inclusive investigation into practical real life happenings. It critically allows for in-depth 
examination of a particular phenomenon, doing so in such a way that the background to the phenomenon 
is comprehensively highlighted and depicted. Therefore, selecting case study as the research approach, 
was appropriate in the circumstances because it fits the characteristic of the study’s conceptual 





interpretive tradition of research of seeing the situation through the eyes of participants in this case, 
employers and managers.  
 
Furthermore, case study approach is ideal for two supplementary reasons. The first is that the “…case 
study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristic of real- life 
events…” (ibid, 2003, p2), and it allows the researcher to go deep. This in particular, fits the research 
goals of this study, especially of participants’ making meaning of their experiences and roles as 
employees. Utilising the case study method has allowed the researcher to answer the question of “how” 
employees view the new remuneration model including their comments on how the model ought to have 
been developed. In the researcher’s view, this is further enhanced through being able to further inquire 
into ‘what’ ideally should have been done by the Government in developing the guidelines on executive 
remuneration and ‘what’ level of consultations would have been sufficient. Yin argues that why and what 
questions favour case studies, and are thus a justifiable rationale for conducting a study which is an 
examination of a phenomenon in nature that also seeks to develop hypotheses and propositions for further 
and insightful understanding into the phenomenon.  
 
The second reason for selecting the case study method is that as argued by Henning (2004), distinctive of 
qualitative case study, the context in which the phenomena is being investigated must be clearly defined 
and the role players must be well articulated. In this regard, this research is a single case study of the 
views of sixty (60) SEC managers with regards to the new remuneration model for SEC and the other 
related issues that they attach to the model. My decision to work with sixty (60) employers is because this 
will give me deeper statistical and interpretive data and this number will allow me to generate rich data. 
This will be further discussed under sampling later in this chapter.  
 
The next section will discuss the methods that were used in the research study and the fieldwork.  
 
3.5 Study Site 
 
The study site is the Swaziland Electricity Company Limited, situated in the Kingdom of Swaziland. SEC 
as highlighted under Chapter One, is a public enterprise wholly owned by the Government of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland and its business is to generate, transmit and distribute electricity in the country. 
Whilst some of the electricity is internally generated, the majority (up to 70%), is imported from the 
Republic of South Africa and Mozambique. At the time of undertaking this study, SEC had about six 






3.6 Target Population 
 
The target population is the entire management team of SEC. This target population works in the 
Operations, Customer Service, Support Services, Finance, Corporate Services and the Managing 
Directors Office which incorporates the Research & Development Unit as well as Internal Audit. This 
represents the entire management spectrum of the Company. Of these, twenty-one (21) one are in senior 
management and eight (8) of these are executive directors. All the managers who work for SEC, are 
essentially based throughout the country and are collectively referred to as the management of the 
Company. Patton (2002) asserts that there are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry and further 
asserts that sample size depends on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, 
what will be useful, what will have credibility and what can be done with available time and resources.  
 
3.7 Sampling Strategies 
 
Purposeful sampling has been used to select the participants in this study and according to Patton (2002), 
this serves the purpose of selecting a specific type of participants that will manifest the phenomenon 
intensely but not extremely. Accordingly, this is linked to the design of the research, as the researcher is 
trying to consider and anticipate the kinds of arguments that will lend credibility to the study. Henning 
(2002) concurs with this approach and averred that the sampling strategy researchers deploy, must 
ordinarily fit the purpose of the study and the questions asked. 
 
Given that this is a case study on SEC particularly the perspectives of the SEC managers on the key issues 
of remuneration and its impact on performance, it is vital that a majority of the managers are given an 
opportunity to explore this phenomenon of the new remunerations regulations. Moreover, this approach to 
sampling is considered adequate for qualitative research because as argued by Leedy & Ormrod (2013), 
purposeful sampling’s key advantage is that it allows the researcher to focus on individuals that will 
provide the most information about the subject under review. It is expected that the managers will provide 
a holistic and objective view of the key issues being canvassed especially given that they are best 
positioned as managers of SEC, to comment on matters that affect their performance. Whilst they are the 
beneficiaries of the remuneration system, their views are not expected to be subjective enough to 







3.8 Sample Size  
 
As argued by Leedy & Ormrod (2013), whilst it is correct that the larger the sample, the more realistic the 
results, this does not always apply. Each context is best judged on its circumstances which is why where 
the same is below 100, it is ideal to sample the entire population. In this specific instance, the entire 




The sample population consisted of all sixty (60) managers of the Company, the key aim being to solicit 
the views of all of them. The only exception was positions that were vacant in April and May 2014 when 
their views were solicited. Essentially their views on key issues around remuneration and its impact on 
performance as well as retention, were solicited through the use of semi-structured questionnaires. 
 
3.10 Data Collection Methods  
 
Primary data was collected from the company’s annual reports from 2007 to 2013, the government 
regulations on executive remuneration, relevant literature on remuneration systems particularly in public 
enterprises as well as journal articles on the subject. Secondary data was gathered through the use of 
semi-structured questionnaires. It is the researcher’s intention that the findings will be used as useful input 
into the development of an alternative remuneration model for all PE’s in Swaziland. The data collection 
is summarised in Table 3-1: 
 
Table 3-1: Data Collection Table 
Type of data  Data collection instrument 
Researcher’s reference 
journal 
Informal entries were made of telephonic conversations and interactions with 
the participants made from the time when requests were made for them to 
participate and other follow-up conversations to check on progress with the 
questionnaire.                                       
Initial telephonic interview 
(pilot study) 
Informal interviews which lasted about 5 minutes with participants who had 
queries on the questionnaire. 






The study employed the two models of the positivist and constructivist orientations. This is a pragmatic 
approach. This approach enabled the researcher to obtain the necessary information guided by the 
research objectives. 
 
3.10.1 Informal Preliminary Session 
 
A week before distributing the questionnaire, the researcher met some of the participants for an initial 
informal conversational interview. This was a necessary exercise because there is value in giving 
participants the semi-structured interview schedules so that they could fully understand the rationale for 
the questions. The additional purpose of this initial session was also to agree on the submission timelines 
given that the questionnaire was distributed in April 2014 which had a number of holidays. It was also 
imperative that the researcher met the participants beforehand, so that there was a discussion on other 
relevant issues that they felt should be addressed by the study. At this stage, the focus was more on the 
creating a platform to explain the objectives of the study and to establish its relevance to the employees 
themselves. In the researcher’s experience at SEC, academic research undertaken on a part-time basis by 
employees, has often been viewed more as assistance to the employee to fulfil his/her academic 
requirements, than as an enquiry on relevant issues within the Company that could potentially offer 
valuable feedback to the organisation. Thus engaging some of the participants informally proved to be a 
beneficial exercise for the participants and the researcher because useful information and contributions 
emerged from this process, and buy-in was effectively established on the value of the study in assisting 
management and the Board of Directors of SEC to fully appreciate the underpinning variables of 
executive remuneration at SEC and its impact on performance. Hatch (2002) concurs with this approach 
and suggests that rather than formal interviews, engaging some of the participants in an informal setting 
has the distinct advantage of creating a climate where of trust and rapport building particularly taking into 
consideration that when you express interest in what other people do, then it is likely to increase their 
interest in what you have to say.  
 
The researcher did not take down notes during the discussions because of the need to ensure that the 
process was casual and relaxed. In addition, the researcher made adjustments on the interview schedule in 
order to accommodate the questions that the participant employees added. However, the participants were 
made to understand beforehand that their informal conversations were part of the data collection process 






3.10.2 Pilot Study 
 
Further to the informal discussion, a pilot questionnaire was sent to at least three (3) managers that were 
randomly selected. The main objective of the pilot phase was to simulate the questionnaire in order to 
address any perceived weaknesses in the design of the questions. The direct result of the pilot was that 
Section D of the initial questionnaire was found to be defective with regards to the rating scale and thus 
had to be varied. In addition, questions in Section D of the initial questionnaire, were amended to be 
aligned to the rating scale.   
 
3.10.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
The semi-structured questionnaire was designed and used to answer the key research objectives 
highlighted in Chapter One, which are reiterated, below:  
 
a) To what extent do the new regulations on remuneration affect the performance of the Swaziland 
Electricity Company?  
b) To what extent does the Swaziland Electricity Company’s remuneration system affect the 
retention of new talent? 
c) How can SEC’s remuneration system effectively contribute towards the sustainability of the 
company?  
 
Consistent with the views expressed by Creswell (2009), the research used the qualitative approach as the 
data was obtained from the participants own natural setting through semi structured questionnaires. As a 
researcher, I thus derived certain insights and general themes from what the SEC managers espoused and 
made interpretations from the meaning of the information gathered. Vithal & Jansen (2010) emphasized 
that in social science research, exploring and understanding implies that the study is qualitative in nature, 
as opposed to determining which suggests that the study is quantitative in nature. The sentiments 
expressed by the managers and their viewpoint on the extent to which the new remuneration regulations 
inhibit or enables their performance, provided the researcher with a good basis from which to draw 
insights and to make certain conclusions about the new remuneration regulations. In particular, their 
views on whether or not the new regulations had affected their desire to stay within company, was also 







The questionnaire was divided into four sections as reflected below: -  
 
a) Section A – General information and biographical data  
b) Section B – their perspective of the new remuneration guidelines (their understanding on how the 
new guidelines were formulated and the objectives of the new guidelines) 
c) Section C – their perspective on how the new remuneration guidelines have impacted on the 
performance of SEC and their own performance. 
d) Section D - their perspective on how the new remuneration guidelines have impacted on the 
reward management at SEC as well as on employee retention. 
 
3.11 Data Quality Control 
 
The semi-structured interview questions were determined deductively. The researcher entered the 
research field to collect data, with a pre-determined theory on reward and remuneration. The data was 
collected to match that theory in terms of allowing participants to respond to specific issues. This type of 
data collection allowed me to develop categories and questions, which factor enhanced the purpose for 
data collection.  
 
Firstly the researcher used the pilot study to simulate the instrument to be used i.e. questionnaire as well 
as to verify it for obvious errors. The researcher used peer debriefing to verify the consistency of the 
findings. Leedy & Ormrod (2013), confirmed that this is one of the creative ways that researchers could 
use to improve reliability and validity of the research instrument. During the pilot study, the questionnaire 
was thoroughly evaluated for possible weaknesses and as stated under Section 3.10.2, the questionnaire 
was then amended to improve it. Secondly and at the end of the data collection stage and with the help of 
a work colleague, a post evaluation was undertaken to test the logic of the answers given by the 
respondents, specifically for consistency and logic. This entailed simulating what the SEC managers went 
through and whether their conclusions were logical and factual. This enabled the researcher to verify the 
accuracy of the information given as well as the reliability of the responses. 
 
3.12 Data Analysis 
 
Once the data was collected from the questionnaires, the information was collated. Thereafter the 
researcher as indicated by Creswell (2009) attempted to understand the logic of the information gathered 





using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The key themes or categories that emerged were 
discussed and qualified through direct quotations, supported by figures and tables. The next chapter 
mainly deals with this. Finally, lessons drawn from the findings were highlighted and contrasted in 
Chapter Five, particularly with the available literature on remuneration and performance. The 
recommendations made in this regard, flow from these findings. 
 
3.13 Ethical Considerations 
 
In undertaking this research, a number of ethical considerations were appreciated and addressed by the 
researcher. Firstly, the University of KwaZulu Natal requires that all research initiatives, be considered by 
an independent panel for ethical implications. The researcher therefore duly submitted the research 
proposal to the University’s Ethics Committee. Only once this formal approval was granted by the Ethics 
Committee, was the researcher able to proceed with the study. Secondly, in implementing the 
questionnaire, all participants were required to complete a consent form. This confirmed that all 
participants willingly took part and were not coerced to participate. All managers who participated signed 
the consent form. Lastly, all managers who participated were assured that their responses were provided 
in private and thus confidentiality was guaranteed. The introductory letter that accompanied all 
questionnaires clearly indicated that participation was voluntary, and that both participation and 
information given, would be done on confidential basis and anonymously. No participant was forced to 
declare their name or identity. The questionnaire design (refer to Annexure D, attached) ensured privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity. The identities of the sample population will remain protected per the 
undertaking given prior to them participating in the study. Even though all the questionnaire participants 
consented to the data collection and voluntarily participated in this research, it is vital that their identities 
are not threatened particularly given that they are all employees of the Company. This has been ensured 
through the way their responses have been coded.  
 
3.14 Limitations of the study 
 
Concerns about case studies have often been raised. One of these is that case studies provide minimal 
foundation for over-simplification. Nonetheless, Yin (2009) argues that the goal in doing a case study is 
to be able to expand and generate theories. From the questionnaires completed by the managers, one can 
generate categories and theories that will in turn provide further insight into the existing phenomenon and 
illuminate its properties. With reference to this study, the researcher’s concern is to offer a rich and in 





responsiveness towards their reward, motivation and retention by the SEC, so that the Company, the 
Board of Directors and other relevant stakeholders can be informed by the findings. 
 
Furthermore, another basic limitation of this study is the time spent in the field. People do not hold 
steadfastly to their opinions at times and so it would have been more desirable to stay in the field longer 
to be able to hold further interviews to substantiate conclusions. It is recommended that further research 
be carried out in the context of Swaziland to determine the extent to which remuneration affects employee 
performance particularly to extend this to include other public enterprises. Lastly, the researcher as well 
as all the participants in the study, all work for SEC and have been affected by the new pay regulations. 
To address this obvious limitation, the researcher validated their perception using a peer from another 
public enterprise with knowledge of the new pay regulations. This was done to test the logical reasoning 
of the participants as well as their accurate recollection of the events leading to the introduction of the 
new pay regulations. To a large extent therefore, their views have been validated to test the subjectivity of 
their responses. Subjectivity however, is inherent in the type of study undertaken particularly because it 




This chapter essentially discussed the methodology employed in this study. Both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches were used to elicit the necessary information for the study.  The case study design 
was employed and was amenable in this context.  The objective was to obtain an in-depth information on 
the perception of the senior employees of SEC and at the same time get quantitative information 
regarding the ratio of employees who hold different opinions.  
 



















In the previous chapter dealt with the approach to the research methodology and design. This chapter 
proceeds to present the findings, analysis and interpretation of the data collected by means of a 
questionnaire on impact of remuneration on the performance of senior managers at the Swaziland 
Electricity Company Limited (SEC). The data analysis was done using the package Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS). The presentation of the results will be in tables and figures which will be 
interpreted for statistical meaning. As argued by Creswell (2009), “interpretation of the results means that 
the researcher draws conclusions from the results for the research questions”, Creswell (2009: p152).  
 
The information will be presented to address the following key elements which Creswell (2009) argues 
are vital in testing the validity of the interpretation of the research findings: 
 
a) Whether the results were statistically significant; 
b) How the key research questions were answered – was the hypothesis supported or not; 
c) Justification the results in terms of the reviewed literature or theories advanced or rational 
thinking; 
d) Implications of the results for current practice or future research. 
 
4.2 Demographic Information 
 
At least four elements of generic demographic information were obtained from the participants to the 
questionnaire i.e. age, gender, years of service, qualifications. The objective was to obtain some insights 
on how this relates to the substantive responses in the questionnaire as related to the key strategic 








4.2.1 Response/Participation Rate 
 
As reflected in Figure 4-1 below, a total of forty-five (45) managers participated in the study out of a total 
sample of fifty four (54) managers, being the entire senior management population of SEC. Whilst 
initially the target was to cover 60 managers, the Company had vacancies in six (6) management positions 
at the time of the implementation of the data collection. Nonetheless, this confirmed a success rate of 
eighty-five percent (85%) which is above the acceptable threshold of 60% for an extrapolation of the 
statistical impact.  
 




As reproduced in Figure 4-2 below, the majority of the managers who participated in the completion of 
the questionnaire, were between the ages of 31 years and 50 years old (77.8%).  
 
































In terms of the SEC Annual Report (2013), SEC’s gender distribution is generally biased towards males 
and this has its origins in Swaziland’s traditional society where males were encouraged to pursue formal 
education whilst females stayed at home to look after the homestead. It is therefore not surprising that the 
Company’s gender distribution at management levels, mirrors this reality. Thus, at least 78% of the SEC 




Figure 4-3: Gender Distribution of the SEC managers who participated in the study 
 
4.2.4 Years of Service 
 
As detailed in Figure 4-4 below, more than a third of the participants (35.6%) have worked for the 
Company for more than 10 years in the company.   
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Figure 4-5: Qualifications of SEC Managers who participated in the study 
 
4.3 Analysis and Interpretation 
 
As indicated in the introduction, one of the key tests of data analysis as suggested by Creswell (2009), 
particularly in qualitative research is that the analysis must be directly linked to the theory. Babbie (2010) 
concurs and proceeds to advance the argument that “qualitative research, involves a continual interplay 
between theory and analysis. In seeking to analyse qualitative data, we seek to discover patterns such as 
changes over time or possible links among the variables”, Babbie (2010: p418). This section therefore 
seeks to establish the linkages not only in relation to the theory underpinning remuneration, motivation, 
retention and performance but also with regards to the research objectives.  
 
All the statements were designed on a 4 points Likert Scale i.e. one point for agree to a large extent and 
four points for disagree to large extent. The mean score below two (2) meant that participants indicated 










4.3.1 Research Objective One: To what extent do the new regulations on remuneration 
affect the performance of SEC? 
 
SEC managers were asked to respond to ten (10) statements regarding the design of the new remuneration 
pay regulations and eleven (11) statements on how the regulations have affected the performance of the 
Company. Table 4-1 below, refers to the design of the pay regulations and Table 4-2 (also below), deals 
with how the pay regulations, have affected the performance of the managers as well as the Company. 
 


















PEs must be sensitive to the general remuneration 
market trends in Swaziland 
 
46.7 28.9 13.3 11.1 1.89 (1.03) 
 
PE's should be totally independent of Government 
in setting remuneration systems 
 
63.0 23.9 8.7 4.3 1.54 (0.84) 
Government may have been compelled to 
introduce the new pay regulations 
23.9 28.3 28.3 19.6 2.43 (1.07) 
The remuneration of executives in PE must be 
reflective of the performance of the respective PE 
78.3 8.7 2.2 10.9 1.46 (0.98) 
The remuneration of the managers in general 
within PE’s must be reflective of the performance 
of the respective PE 
69.6 15.2 8.7 6.5 1.52 (0.91) 
The rationale behind grouping of PEs as the basis 
for pay differentiation 
17.8 17.8 42.2 22.2 2.69 (1.02) 
The boards of directors of PE’s must be consulted 
in the development of pay 
21.7 41.3 19.6 17.4 2.33 (1.01) 
The management collective of PE’s must also be 
consulted in the development of pay regulations 
56.5 23.9 15.2 4.3 1.67 (0.90) 
Consulting the management collective of PE’s on 
remuneration systems would be undermined 
because of perceptions of conflict of interest 
13.3 26.7 44.4 15.6 2.62 (0.91) 
 
Any pay regulations, must by design, incentivize 
superior performance 
 
62.2 24.4 2.2 11.1 1.62 (0.98) 






Out of the 10 statements in Table 4-1 above, the majority of the participants responded positively in at 
least eight (8) of the statements. 
 
Out of the 11 statements in Table 4-2 (below), responses were evenly split between positive and negative 
responses.  
 

















The new pay regulation have positively affected the 
performance of managers at SEC 
15.6 6.7 22.2 55.6 3.18 (1.11) 
The new pay regulation have introduced clear 
mechanisms to reward performance 
6.5 6.5 26.1 60.9 3.41 (0.88) 
The managers at SEC have been motivated to 
perform higher as a result of the new pay regulations 
4.3 2.2 15.2 78.3 3.67 (0.73) 
There is a direct correlation between financial 
reward systems and motivation of employees 
39.1 32.6 15.2 13.0 2.02 (1.04) 
Managers in particular, are not necessarily motivated 
to perform higher by direct financial incentives only 
21.7 37.0 30.4 10.9 2.30 (0.94) 
The work structure remains satisfying, pay becomes 
a secondary matter 
13.0 43.5 32.6 10.9 2.41 (0.86) 
The level of motivation of managers has affected the 
performance of the rest of employees within SEC 
30.4 39.1 13.0 17.4 2.17 (1.06) 
The development of a high performance organisation 
culture is not solely dependent on remuneration 
system 
37.8 40.0 13.3 8.9 1.93 (0.94) 
The profitability of SEC has been affected by the 
introduction of the new pay regulations 
15.6 33.3 37.8 13.3 2.49 (0.92) 
The long term sustainability of SEC has been 
enhanced with the advent of the new pay regulations 
8.7 19.6 37.0 34.8 2.98 (0.95) 
Commitment to the performance management 
culture of SEC has been made easier with the 
introduction of the new pay regulations 
2.2 15.6 42.2 40.0 3.20 (0.79) 







Starting with Table 4-1 which speaks to the design of the remuneration guidelines, 86.9% positively 
agreed that PE’s should be totally independent of Government in setting remuneration systems. Whilst 
this view would seem to suggest that Government as shareholder, does not have a role to play in 
remuneration design, it is contrary to what occurs in practice. As advanced by Olivia (2012), matters 
around executive remuneration have become very contentious and vexed particularly in recent times 
owing to a number of factors amongst which are developments in regulation, media scrutiny and broader 
stakeholder pressures. Given the perception that PE’s spend public money, it is perhaps unfair and to a 
large extent, inconceivable that managers of PE’s would be immune to public scrutiny on matters related 
to pay.  
 
It would therefore appear to the researcher that the overwhelming vote against scrutiny in this regard, may 
have been driven more by the general frustrations from the SEC managers, than actual reality on the 
ground particularly given that best practice favours more activism from the shareholder not less. The 
additional reason for this may be found in what Core et al (1998) defines as the general lethargy of 
Boards of Directors given that in most instances, boards tend to be controlled by the Chief Executive 
Officers (CEO) and thus become ineffectual. This is because board members tend to avoid 
confrontational positions or situations that may put then in conflict with the view of the CEO. Thus with 
the reality of ineffective Boards, shareholders like the Government of Swaziland, have no choice but to 
insist that remuneration policies be approved at shareholder level. 
 
Eight-seven percent (87%) agreed that the remuneration of executives in PE must be reflective of the 
performance of the respective public enterprise (PE) and 84.8% strongly agreed that the remuneration of 
managers within PE’s, must in general be reflective of the performance of the respective PE. This finding 
seems to confirm the general literature as discussed in Chapter Two. For example, it was argued by 
Flannery et al (1996), that employers no longer favour traditional pay systems because they argue that it 
impedes growth and success of an organisation. They instead advocate what Niranjana & Pattanayak 
(2005) termed as the contemporary practices of performance-based and variable pay strategies, 
particularly in the public sector around the world.  
 
Furthermore, the majority of the employees (86.6%) agreed that any pay regulations, must by design, 
incentivise superior performance. As was suggested by WorldatWork (200&) pay for performance has 
increasingly emerged as an answer to solve the problem of distinguishing poor and excellent 
performance, as a way of motivating and retaining employees. SEC managers clearly agree to ‘put their 






About two-thirds of the employees (64.4%) disagreed with the logic behind the categorisation of PE’s 
solely on the basis of Company assets. As was indicated in Chapter One, the Government of Swaziland 
initially introduced Circular No. 3 of 2010. This pay guideline introduced the notion of the categorization 
of PE’s solely on the basis of Company assets. Circular No. 3 of 2010 was however superseded by 
Circular 4 of 2013. The perceptions of SEC managers vindicated the replacement of the initial guideline. 
However when both guidelines were designed by Government, PE’s were not consulted either at Board 
level or management level. Given this, at least 63% of managers of managers felt that this was wrong and 
at least 80% felt very strongly that the management collective of PE’s should have been consulted when 
the pay regulations were designed.  
 
As was argued by Bendix (2005), consultation lies at the heart of good employee relations practice. 
Consultation in employment relations is explained in very distinct terms to negotiations. Whilst the latter 
refers to engaging another party with the intention to reach an agreement, the former merely relates to the 
process of taking into consideration the views and perceptions of the other party, particularly where terms 
and conditions of service are concerned. This may not necessarily result in agreement. Given this, SEC 
managers felt quite strongly that the lack of consultation in the development of the new pay regulations, 
undermined the intentions of the Government of Swaziland and rendered the new pay regulations, 
ineffectual. At least 40% actually felt that existence of a potential conflict of interest would not have 
undermined the quality of their input into the process of designing the new pay regulations. It is assumed 
that Government’s intention in developing the new pay regulations was to address concerns on the high 
salaries of executives in the context of ensuring that PE’s delivered more value for money for the state. 
Given this reasonable assumption, more than 86% of SEC managers confirmed that management pay, 
must be directly linked to the performance of PE’s. It would therefore seem to the researcher, that the 
rationale for not consulting either the Board of PE’s or the management, was not based on any logical or 
rational reasoning as the management of PE’s agreed that they must be held accountable for the 
performance of PE’s and that their remuneration must reflect this.  
 
More than two-thirds of the employees (71%) positively agreed that there is a direct correlation between 
financial reward systems and motivation of employees. The results (69% of managers) also allude to the 
reality that the level of motivation of managers has affected the performance of the rest of employees 
within SEC. It would therefore seem to the researcher that despite the clear existence of massive literature 
on the link between pay and performance, by introducing the new regulations on remuneration of 





the regulations resulting in unintended consequences. It could not have been Government’s intention to 
undermine performance within PE’s and to a large extent, to even threaten the long term sustainability of 
the PE’s. This is because in Government’s own words, the role of PE’s is to drive economic growth and 
to create employment. Therefore the reality that at least 72% of managers feel that the new pay 
regulations have emasculated SEC’s long term sustainability, should worry the shareholder as this 
confirms that the regulations have had unpremeditated consequences.  
 
How this can be addressed will be covered in the next chapter. Despite SEC managers generally feeling 
that the pay regulations have not been designed well and that they have not impacted positively on their 
performance and that of the Company, there is recognition that pay alone would not influence the 
development of a high performance culture. At least 78% of managers felt that the development of a high 
performance organisation culture is not solely dependent on remuneration system. This finding confirms 
the definition Maslow’s theory of motivation as well as the Goal Setting theory. The former advances the 
argument that satisfaction of one need leads to the natural desire to seek satisfaction in a higher need. The 
latter theory links personal satisfaction to the attainment of the overall objectives of the organisation.  
 
Considering all the 11 statements, the aggregate mean score was 2.41 (SD = 0.42) indicated that overall, 
the new remuneration regulations negatively affected the performance of the SEC.   
 
4.3.2 Research Objective 2: To what extent does SEC’s remuneration system affect the 
retention of talent? 
 
The findings on the impact between SEC’s remuneration system and talent retention are highlighted in 































Remuneration system design is vital when recruiting 
new employees to the company 
4.3 6.5 23.9 65.2 3.50 (0.81) 
Remuneration system design is also an imperative 
tool in the company's ability to retain skilled 
employees 
2.2 2.2 13.0 82.6 3.76 (0.60) 
Remuneration system design is essential in managing 
the company's turnover rate 
2.2 17.4 43.5 37.0 3.15 (0.79) 
SEC remuneration system design is perceived to be 
fair and does not contribute to increased turnover 
4.3 17.4 41.3 37.0 3.12 (0.85) 
Remuneration system design is perceived to be 
directly linked to the goals of the company 
2.2 13.0 37.0 47.9 3.30 (0.79) 
SEC's current remuneration design is hugely 
influenced by performance based pay elements 
20.0 42.2 28.9 8.9 2.27 (0.89) 
SEC's current remuneration design is hugely 
influenced by skills and competency based pay 
elements given the nature of the industry and 
operations of the company 
2.2 15.2 28.3 54.3 3.35 (0.82) 
Aggregate mean score (SD) 3.21 (0.41) 
 
Table 4-3 above contained seven (7) statements on how SEC’s remuneration effectively affected talent 
retention. Eighty-nine percent (89%) of managers did not agree with the statement that employees are 
attracted to an organisation because of pay only. An overwhelming 95% did not agree that employees stay 
in an organisation primarily because of pay nor that the pay system is an essential tool in managing an 
organisations turnover. A majority of managers (78%) however, felt that SEC’s pay system was not fair 
and actually contributed to SEC’s turnover rate. It must be recalled as was highlighted in Chapter One, 
that SEC’s turnover rate has increased sharply since the advent of the new pay regulations. Now if as 
reflected in the preceding paragraph, managers feel that pay alone does not attract an employee to an 
organisation nor makes him/her stay, why then did SEC managers overwhelmingly believe that the 
Company’s pay system, had directly contributed to the increase in turnover? The answer may lie in fully 










Figure 4-6: Abelson’s expanded avoidability breakdown of employee turnover, Source: Lee G, J. (2011) HR Metrics – Practical Measurement 
Tools for People Management. Knowres Publishing, South Africa. p. 210 












 Better pay elsewhere  
 Better working conditions 
elsewhere  
 Problem with leadership & 
administration  




 Forced Retirement 
No/ 
Unavoidable 
 Move to another location  
 Mid-career change 
 Stay home to care for spouse or 
children 
 Pregnancy, did not return after 
limited period of time  
 
 Severe medical 
 Death 
 
Figure 4.5 suggests that there are more reasons for employees to opt out of an organisation than issues of 
pay. Lee (2011) therefore suggests that there cause-effect relationship between pay and turnover, is non-
linear which fact underlies its complexity. He proceeds to argue that “turnover has long been a central and 
enduring topic in HR and management and that in unlike other issues that are really transient fads, in a 
worldwide knowledge-based economy where skills shortages are a constant challenge, employee turnover 
shows no sign of ceasing to be an important HR issue”, Lee (2011: p209). It is therefore understandable 
that whilst on the one level managers share the view that employees are not necessary attracted by pay nor 
stay as a result of it, on another level, they however argue that SEC’s turnover rate can be directly 
attributable to the pay system. Pay issues by their nature, are complex which explains why understanding 
turnover is in itself, a complex matter.  
 
The majority of managers (84%) nevertheless strongly agreed that remuneration system design was 
perceived to be directly linked to the goals of the company. No less than 82.6% of managers felt that 
SEC's current remuneration design must be hugely influenced by skills and competency based pay 
elements given the nature of the industry and operations of the company. This finding resonates with the 
skills and competency based pay approach of Armstrong & Murlis (1994), Homan (2000), Byars & Rue 
(2004) and Shields (2007), all of whom argued that competency based pay inspires employees to improve 
their skills in line with organisational objectives and values.   
 
Considering all the statements, the overall mean score was found to be 3.21 (SD = 0.41) which indicated 







4.3.3 Research Objective 3: Impact of SEC’s remuneration system on the sustainability of 
the Company. 
 
As could be viewed from Table 4-2, some of the eleven (11) statements dealt with the perceptions of the 
managers on how the pay regulations had affected their performance and that of the Company. Only 
22.3% of managers felt that the new pay regulations have positively affected the performance of 
managers at SEC. To make matters worse, only 13% of managers felt that the new pay regulations have 
introduced clear and coherent mechanisms to reward performance, with only 6.5% confirming that the 
pay regulations have impacted positively on their motivation. 
 
Given the challenges that SEC is going through, the majority of which are beyond the control of the 
Company as detailed in Chapter One, it is an indictment that 82% of managers are of the view that the 
new pay regulations greatly undermine the Company’s ability to create a high performance culture. The 
primary responsibility of managers in organisations is to drive performance and ensure the long term 
sustainability of their respective organisations. Bussin (2013) puts this assertion is its proper context when 
he opines that “high performance is a standard we strive for in all our life’s activities. It implies doing a 
difficult thing well, whether personal or professional, and it often commands admiration and reaps 
rewards. The workplace is no exception and high performers often expect their achievements to be 
evident in their remuneration”, Bussin (2013: p129).  
 
The general views on the impact of the new pay regulations on the Company, would seem to have indeed 
affected the performance of the Company as can be gleaned from an appreciation of the results of SEC as 
reflected in Figure 1-1 discussed in Chapter One. In the three years wherein the regulations were at play 
(2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), profitability reduced from a high of R188million in 2011 to R72m in 2013 and 
slightly improving to E78million in 2014. Whilst this could not be directly and solely attributable to the 
advent of the new pay regulations, it may be sufficient to say that the lack of motivation within the senior 
management team coupled with an analysis of the results of this research, strongly indicates that this may 










The preceding chapter dealt with the presentation of the results of the data analysis. Unfortunately, most 
participants in the questionnaire, did not respond to the written or open sections of the questionnaire. It 
therefore was not possible to make extrapolations and analysis on the very few comments hence it this 
approach was discarded so as not to lad to any bias in the analysis of the data.   
 
The next chapter will deal with the conclusions to this process and recommendations. Based on the 
conclusions and the recommendations, lessons will be drawn from how the new pay regulations were 
implemented developed and implemented, and how this process can be improved going forward. Given 
that the rationale for this research was to contribute towards the development of a more sustainable 




















CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The rationale behind this research was to evaluate the impact of remuneration on the performance of 
senior managers at the Swaziland Electricity Company.  
 
The aim of chapter five is to integrate the results obtained in data analysis highlighted in Chapter Four, 
with the literature review in order to draw conclusions and inferences. In addition, recommendations from 
the research will be highlighted. 
 
5.2 Motivation and rationale underpinning the study 
 
The research was generally motivated by the desire to see PE’s being transformed to truly high 
performance organisations where talent management and retention, lies at the heart of the organisation’s 
human capital strategy. As reflected in the analysis of SEC’ performance highlighted in the Annual 
Report (2012/13), the performance of SEC since the organisation was transformed to a limited liability 
company in 2007, does not bode well for the future viability of this critical PE. Given the reality that 
countries like Swaziland have historically struggled to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to address 
the developmental needs of its people, PE’s like SEC have tended to play a very critical role not only in 
providing employment but also in addressing the infrastructure requirements of the country. It is therefore 
the researcher’s fervent hope that the findings of this research will: - 
 
a) Contribute towards a better understanding of the impact of remuneration on the performance of 
SEC particularly since 2007; 
b) Be useful to the Board of Directors of SEC in fully comprehending the views of the management 
collective with regards to remuneration policies and practices as well as their impact in enabling 
the development of the company to a high performance organisation and hence contribute 
meaningfully to the sustainability of the Company; 
c) Enrich the knowledge base of the remuneration policies of PE’s and may be useful input into the 






5.3 Conclusions from the findings of the data analysis 
 
As was indicated in Chapter One, the Government of Swaziland introduced guidelines on executive pay 
in 2010 which affected the remuneration of senior managers in all public enterprises in Swaziland 
including the Swaziland Electricity Company. These guidelines were further amended in 2013. Prior to 
this period, PE’s determined their own remuneration policies in line with their underpinning business 
fundamentals. Remuneration policies generally required only the approval of the respective Boards of 
Directors and required shareholder approval, only in very minimal and exceptional circumstances. In 
particular shareholder approval was only required when annual cost of living increases normally awarded 
to employees to compensate for the impact of inflation, exceeded the annual pay increase limit approved 
by the Public Enterprise Unit.  
 
Drawing from the findings in the data analysis in so far as the new pay regulations have affected senior 
managers at the Swaziland Electricity Company Limited, the following five (5) key inferences may be 
drawn: 
 
a) None of the instruments introduced by Government from 2010 to date, are premised on any clear 
strategic intent or at the very least, any theoretical underpin. The remuneration of executives is 
not designed to improve performance given that a review of the guidelines, does not expressly 
seek to link pay and performance. As advocated by the Expectancy Theory and the Goal Setting 
Theory, there should be: 
 A clear alignment of performance and the rewards (instrumentality) and managers should 
communicate to employees the behaviours that will be rewarded. 
 Rewards should be created to meet different group needs. Whilst this may be costly and 
difficult, remuneration design must take into consideration the collective needs of groups 
of employees particularly because at the lower levels, reward design is influenced mainly 
by collective bargaining whilst at the higher levels, this is not so.   
 Managers should increase expectancy by training employees to be more efficient and 
eliminating any barriers to performance.  
Whilst certain sections of the guidelines refer to the need for public enterprises to establish 
performance incentive schemes, where payable, performance incentives would be made over and 
above guaranteed salary. However, for the recommended pay guidelines and pay ranges to be 





performance parameters to be established between the PE’s and the Public Enterprise Unit. The 
design of the performance contract should be in the line of shareholder pacts, examples of which 
exist in private sector companies. These could be customized for the public sector given that 
profit and shareholder maximisation does not underpin the operation of most PE’s. Shareholder 
pacts would generally refer to key financial and qualitative ratios that organisations then use as 
key performance targets. Examples of financial indicators would include return on investment 
(ROI), return on equity (ROE), liquidity ratios, debt equity ratio, activity ratio like debtor and 
creditor days, price earnings ratio, gross and net profit margin, earnings before interest, taxes and 
amortisation, dividend cover ratio, net cash from operating activities, return on net capital 
employed. Examples of qualitative indicators would include manpower productivity ratios, 
efficiency ratios, customer satisfaction index etc. 
 
b) There was no consultation between Government and all role players that are responsible for the 
running of PE’s, on the new pay regulations prior to their introduction in 2010 and their review in 
2013. Because of the lack of consultation between the Boards of Directors of PE’s, the 
management teams of PE’s and the Government of Swaziland, Swaziland as a country, has lost a 
very critical opportunity to positively influence the performance of PE’s. Most PE’s have a 
developmental underpin hence the need to ensure that they effectively make progress in the 
achievement of their mandate. Pay policy is a key leverage that shareholders can use to drive 
organisations to higher levels of performance. Whilst it may be suggested that financial incentives 
alone do not necessary drive superior performance, the absence of a clear rationale behind any 
policy has much more detrimental effect on employees particularly managers.  
 
c) SEC managers overwhelmingly confirmed through this research, that their emotional connection 
to the Company has been greatly undermined by the advent of the pay regulations. In addition, 
SEC managers have confirmed that manager morale and motivation, has been greatly affected 
since the advent of the pay regulations, to a point where company performance has begun to be 
negatively affected. This research has validated the views articulated by WorldatWork (2007) that 
compensation systems are key to eliciting and reinforcing behaviours that support firm strategy 
and that this can have a substantial positive or negative effect on performance. 
 
d) Whilst SEC managers confirmed that their performance and motivation has been affected, they 
also did clearly articulate and address the myth that excellent pay is the key driver of employee 





however confirm that employee retention has more to do with working conditions and 
environment, than with a singular focus on pay. Despite the reality that SEC’s turnover rate has 
increased in recent years, as demonstrated in Chapter One, the key driver of this is not necessarily 
the advent of the pay regulations. However, given that their emotional attachment to the 
organisation has now been undermined by the new pay regulations, it can be expected that their 
loyalty and sense of belonging to SEC will be greatly challenged going forward. The ‘resign and 
stay’ culture is unfortunate if prevalent at management levels particularly because it will 
definitely begin to affect productivity and commitment.  
 
e) Employees in any work setting (managers included), are always in-ward looking when they deal 
with matters of pay. The findings indicated that SEC managers felt that the shareholder’s 
involvement in the design of pay policies must be minimal. However, best practice and global 
experience indicates otherwise. Olivia (2012), suggests that given the contentious and vexed 
nature of compensation, no shareholder worth his/her salt, can leave this area purely to Boards of 
Directors and management. Shareholders have become very vocal and active in the determination 
of pay and incentives and this they do in approving or rejecting pay policies at annual general 
meetings. It therefore is the researcher’s conclusion that the Government of Swaziland, was 
correct and within her rights to influence pay policy within PE’s in Swaziland. Rather than the 
focus being the pay regulations themselves, questions must be raised on the process used to 
determine the pay regulations because if left to the devices of organisations, then chances exist 




As reflected in Chapter Two and as suggested by Flannery et al (1996), employers have come to 
collectively conclude that traditional pay systems impede growth and success of an organisation and that 
this has caused many organisations to consider new and improved compensation resolutions that support 
the new emphasis on values such as quality, customer service, teamwork and productivity. One of the key 
objectives of the research study was to contribute towards a better understanding of the impact of 
remuneration on the performance of PE’s in general as well as to enrich the knowledge base of the 
remuneration policies of PE’s. In the author’s view, the research findings may be useful input into the 
development of a more sustainable regulatory approach to remuneration of PE’s in Swaziland. It is 








5.4.1 Recommendations on the design of remuneration systems for PE’s 
 
The following recommendations can be made with regards to the design of remuneration systems for 
PE’s: 
 Government as a shareholder must engage PE’s to develop clear strategic deliverables that are 
aligned to Government’s programme of action and development agenda. Pay policies work 
effectively, when they directly aid the achievement of set objectives.  
 Based on this interaction, shareholder compacts or agreements with the various Board’s of 
Directors, must then be agreed upon and signed. These agreements will stipulate timeframes with 
respect to achievement of the set objectives and will also stipulate the type of support that will be 
necessary for the PE’s to deliver on their mandate. 
 Remuneration policies, must then be developed in alignment with the shareholder agreements. In 
particular and central to the remuneration policies, must be the development of a high 
performance organisation culture charter.  
 Performance incentives and general pay policy will then be contextualized within the confines of 
the high performance organisation culture.  
 This means that as a principle, Government must move away from designing pay policies that are 
a ‘one glove fits all’. PE’s are different, their mandate differs and their underpinning operational 
environments significantly differ. Failure to take this into account, will result in the development 
of policies that do not promote best practice nor aid the achievement of the respective goals of the 
various PE’s. 
 
5.4.2 Recommendations on the role of Boards of Directors in the design of remuneration 
systems for PE’s 
 
The following recommendations can be made with regards to the design of remuneration systems for 
PE’s: 
 Ultimately, Boards of Directors are appointed by the shareholder to effectively represent their 
interests in running of PE’s. The role of Boards must be to solely create shareholder value and to 
continuously increase return on equity. This commercial focus is necessary if delivering on the 





space and room to put in place measures that will enhance their ability to deliver on the 
shareholder’s expectations. Shareholder agreements must therefore clearly articulate this. If 
Board’s fail in their overall mandate, then they must be held accountable but this must not be 
undermined by shareholder interference. 
 Pay policies lie at the heart of managing organisations given that they are suitable in sanctioning 
non-performance or rewarding superior performance. As such, the development of pay policies 
must be exclusive preserve of Board’s of Directors although this may still be subject to the 
approval of the shareholder.  
 
5.4.3 Recommendations on the types of remuneration systems that are suitable for PE’s 
 
The following recommendations can be made with regards to the types of remuneration systems that are 
suitable for PE’s: 
 Whilst traditional pay systems focus on guaranteed pay, best practice explored in this research, 
has indicated that progressive pay policies emphasize issues like sustainability of companies and 
achievement of return on equity.  
 Government must therefore seriously consider long term value creation through implementing 
profit share schemes for senior managers or aggressive pay for performance schemes.  
 The current trend of focusing purely on guaranteed pay negates the potential of long term value 
creation given that employees also tend to maximize guaranteed pay at the expense of driving 
superior performance.  
 A combination of guaranteed and variable pay must form the basket of pay policies applicable in 
PE’s. These have worked well in private companies and thus have the potential of delivering 
value for public organisations, provided enough checks and balances are incorporated into the 
design of the pay so that excesses are curbed.  
 
Farnham & White (2011) summarise the call to action on remuneration of public service organisations 
quite well when they note that public sector pay reform must seriously consider “better performance 
management to ensure that failure is not rewarded; greater transparency so that taxpayers know who is 
being paid how much for doing what; more rigorous processes for setting public sector pay; more 
coherence in the way in which public sector pay is set, underpinned by a set of sector-wide principles; and 
the establishment of top pay commission to bring together and expand the remit of the existing pay 
review bodies”, Farnham & White (2011: p45). Developing remuneration levels for public enterprises 





the PE’s, must be taken into consideration with regards to remuneration systems. In this regard, the South 
African example of the Independent Commission on the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers, is a good 
example in point. This Commission is responsible for developing salaries, benefits and allowances of all 
public officials, but does so in  manner that takes the long term interests of all public sector organisations. 
The Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland will in the researcher’s view, do well by benchmarking 
how other countries remunerate PE’s as well as ensure that they fundamentally drive the economic and 
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Title of Survey: The impact of remuneration on the performance of senior managers: A case study of 




The purpose of this survey is to solicit information from managers regarding their views and perceptions 
on how the new government regulations on pay, have impacted on their performance and retention within 
SEC. The information and ratings you provide us will go a long way in helping us identify the link 
between remuneration policies and performance. The questionnaire should only take you between 10-15 
minutes to complete. In this questionnaire, you are asked to indicate what is true for you, so there are no 
“right” or “wrong” answers to any question. Work as rapidly as you can. If you wish to make a comment 

















QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE MANAGER OF THE SWAZILAND ELECTRICITY COMPANY 
(SEC) 
 
SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
 




Older than 50 4 
 









More than 20 years 5 
 
A4             Qualifications 
Form 5 or Matric 1 
Diploma 2 
Degree 3 











SECTION B: NEW REGULATIONS ON REMUNERATION 
 
Please indicate by marking an X, your most appropriate answer to the questions using the rating scale 
below: 
Scale: 1 – Agree to a large extent  
           2 – Agree to some extent  
           3 – Disagree to some extent 
           4 – Disagree to a great extent 
 
A5 To what extent do you agree that salaries in Public Enterprises 
(PE’s) must be sensitive to the general remuneration market trends 
in Swaziland? 
1 2 3 4 
A6 To what extent do you agree that PE’s in Swaziland should be 
totally independent of Government in setting remuneration 
systems? 
1 2 3 4 
A7 To what extent do you agree that the Government may have been 
compelled to introduce the new pay regulations (Circular No. 3 of 
2010 and No. 4 of 2013) because of what it perceived to be high 
salaries within public enterprises (PE’s)? 
1 2 3 4 
A8 To what extent do you agree that the remuneration of executives in 
PE’s must be reflective of the performance of the respective PE?  
1 2 3 4 
A9 To what extent do you agree that the remuneration of managers in 
general within PE’s must be reflective of the performance of the 
respective PE? 
1 2 3 4 
A10 To what extent do you agree with the rationale behind grouping of 
PE’s as the basis for pay differentiation? 
1 2 3 4 
A11 To what extent do you agree that the Boards of Directors of PE’s 
must be consulted in the development of pay regulations? 
1 2 3 4 
A12 To what extent do you agree that the management collective of 
PE’s must also be consulted in the development of pay 
regulations? 
1 2 3 4 
A13 To what extent to do agree that consulting the management 
collective of PE’s on remuneration systems would be undermined 





because of perceptions of conflict of interest?  
A14 To what extent do you agree that any pay regulations, must by 
design, incentivize superior performance? 
1 2 3 4 
 

































SECTION C: IMPACT OF THE NEW PAY REGULATIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF 
SEC 
 
Please indicate by marking an X, your most appropriate answer to the questions using the rating scale 
below: 
Scale: 1 – Agree to a large extent  
           2 – Agree to some extent  
           3 – Disagree to some extent 
           4 – Disagree to a great extent 
 
A15 To what extent do you agree that the new pay regulations 
(Circular 3 of 2010 and Circular 4 of 2013) have 
positively affected the performance of managers at SEC 
1 2 3 4 
A16 To what extent do you agree that the new pay regulations 
have introduced clear mechanisms to reward 
performance? 
1 2 3 4 
A17 To what extent do you agree that managers at SEC have 
been motivated to perform higher as a result of the new 
pay regulations? 
1 2 3 4 
A18 To what extent do you agree that there is a direct 
correlation between financial reward systems and 
motivation of employees? 
1 2 3 4 
A19 To what extent do you agree that managers in particular, 
are not necessarily motivated to perform higher by direct 
financial incentives only? 
1 2 3 4 
A20 To what extent do you agree that if the work structure 
remains satisfying, pay becomes a secondary matter? 
1 2 3 4 
A21 To what extent do you agree that the level of motivation of 
managers has affected the performance of the rest of 
employees within SEC? 
1 2 3 4 
A22 To what extent do you agree that the development of a 
high performance organisation culture is not solely 
dependent on remuneration systems? 





A23 To what extent do you agree that the profitability of SEC 
has been affected by the introduction of the new pay 
regulations? 
1 2 3 4 
A24 To what extent do you agree that the long term 
sustainability of SEC has been enhanced with the advent 
of the new pay regulations? 
1 2 3 4 
A25 To what extent do you agree that commitment to the 
performance management culture of SEC has been made 
easier with the introduction of the new pay regulations? 
1 2 3 4 
 
Kindly comment (where necessary) on the impact of the new pay regulations on the general performance 



























SECTION C: REWARD MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RETENTION WITHIN SEC 
 
Please indicate by marking an X, your most appropriate answer to the questions using the rating scale 
below: 
Scale: 1 – Not important  
           2 – Important to some extent  
           3 – Important 
           4 – Very important 
 
A26 Remuneration system design is critical to the recruiting of 
new employees. 
1 2 3 4 
A27 Remuneration system design is also vital to a company’s 
ability to retain skilled employees 
1 2 3 4 
A28 Remuneration system design is critical to managing the 
company’s turnover rate.  
1 2 3 4 
A29 Remuneration system design within the company is 
perceived to be fair and does not contribute to increased 
turnover. 
1 2 3 4 
A30 Remuneration system design within the company is 
perceived to be directly linked to the goals of the 
company. 
1 2 3 4 
A31 SEC’s current remuneration design is hugely influenced 
by performance based pay elements.  
1 2 3 4 
A32 SEC’s current remuneration design is hugely influenced 
by skills and competency based pay elements 
1 2 3 4 
A33 SEC’s current remuneration design must be based on base 
or guaranteed pay concepts. There is no need to build in 
skills and competency based pay or performance based 
pay elements 
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below: 
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A23 To what extent do you agree that the profitability of SEC 
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SECTION D: REWARD MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RETENTION WITHIN SEC 
 
Please indicate by marking an X, your most appropriate answer to the questions using the rating scale 
below: 
Scale: 1 – Not important  
           2 – Important to some extent  
           3 – Important 
           4 – Very important 
 
A26 Remuneration system design is vital when recruiting new 
employees to the Company. 
1 2 3 4 
A27 Remuneration system design is also an imperative tool in 
the company’s ability to retain skilled employees 
1 2 3 4 
A28 Remuneration system design is essential in managing the 
company’s turnover rate.  
1 2 3 4 
A29 It is vital that remuneration system design is perceived to 
be fair and does not contribute to increased turnover. 
1 2 3 4 
A30 It is essential that remuneration system design is perceived 
to be directly linked to the goals of the company. 
1 2 3 4 
A31 SEC’s current remuneration design is hugely influenced 
by performance based pay elements.  
1 2 3 4 
A32 SEC’s current remuneration design must be hugely 
influenced by skills and competency based pay elements 
given the nature of the industry and operations of the 
Company  














Kindly comment (if necessary) on how the new pay regulations have affected talent retention within SEC: 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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